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The Cost of Sharing Information in a Social World
Arthi Ramachandran
With the increasing prevalence of large scale online social networks, the field has
evolved from studying small scale networks and interactions to massive ones that encom-
pass huge fractions of the world’s population. While many methods focus on techniques at
scale applied to a single domain, methods that apply techniques across multiple domains
are becoming increasingly important. These methods rely on understanding the complex
relationships in the data. In the context of social networks, the big data available allows us
to better model and analyze the flow of information within the network.
The first part of this thesis discusses methods to more effectively learn and predict in a
social network by leveraging information across multiple domains and types of data. We
document a method to identify users from their access to content in a network and their
click behavior. Even on a macro level, click behavior is often hard to obtain. We describe a
technique to predict click behavior using other public information about the social network.
Communication within a network inevitably has some bias that can be attributed to
individual preferences and quality as well as the underlying structure of the network. The
second part of the thesis characterizes the structural bias in a network by modeling the
underlying information flow as a commodity of trade.
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Introduction
Social networks research studies the interrelationships between different agents in a sys-
tem and understand how these interactions can lead to complex phenomena. Such networks
include friendship networks (e.g., Facebook), communication networks (e.g., arXiv collab-
oration networks), communication networks (e.g., Twitter), or even disease transmission
networks. Over the last couple of decades, the field has evolved from studying small scale
networks and interactions to massive ones that encompass huge fractions of the world’s
population. Much of this expansion in scale has been made possible by the increased
prevalence of online social networks such as Facebook and Twitter among others. The re-
sultant information exchanges and networks have transformed the research questions from
primarily sociological in nature to predominantly computational.
With all the different types of networks in use, there are many forms of communication
that arise. For example, a collaboration network might be sparser with less frequent com-
munications than an email network. Or the importance of a link in a disease transmission
network comes into effect with the first contact while for an online social network, contin-
ued contact is more crucial. In spite of these differences between networks, the questions
researchers ask in each of these domains are fundamentally very similar – How do infor-
mation move across the network? What are the drivers as well as consequences of various
network structures? What is the impact of behavioral changes?
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0.1 Directions in Social Networks
We now give an overview of some of the major directions of research in Social Networks
and describe some of the techniques used to address these questions.
How is information shared in social networks? A core function of many networks is to
convey information in some fashion. Research questions in this area involve modeling the
flow of information through a network. Early research in online social networks focused
on measuring and understanding the resultant information diffusion structures (called ‘cas-
cades’). The vast majority of such cascades tend to be shallow and narrow i.e., they reach
only a few individuals with a minimal number of hops from the starting point (Figure 0.2).
This holds true across several contexts including news or other media content on platforms
such as Twitter [Goel, Watts, and Goldstein 2012; Goel et al. 2016] and recommendation
networks in viral marketing [Leskovec, Singh, and Kleinberg 2006; Leskovec, Adamic,
and Huberman 2007]. On the other hand, a small fraction of the cascades become quite
large (in either breadth or depth) [Dow, Adamic, and Friggeri 2013; Adamic, Lento, and
Fiore 2012]. Such cascades can can gain size through very different means (for instance,
relying on a single major source vs. smaller organic diffusion). In terms of shape of cas-
cades, while there are many different structures that emerge, cascades largely fall into a
few broad shape classes [Leskovec et al. 2007] (Figure 0.1).
Can we predict influence? This understanding of diffusion structures leads us to another
major question studied in information flow - can we a priori predict the influence or the
spread of a piece of media or information? One key observation in the literature is the
importance of the use of time-based features (e.g., the initial cascade details or the change
in features over several units of time) in the prediction of cascade size. This time com-
ponent can be differently accounted for by including a Bayesian approach [Zaman, Fox,
and Bradlow 2014], reformulating the problem into several stages [Cheng et al. 2014], and
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Figure 0.1: Graphical representation of common cascade shapes (order by frequency)
[Leskovec et al. 2007]
Figure 0.2: Distribution of cascade structures of different social networks for (A) cascade
shapes (B) total cascade size (C) cascade depth [Goel, Watts, and Goldstein 2012]
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Figure 0.3: Model for external in-
fluence in information diffusion in
a social network [Myers, Zhu, and
Leskovec 2012]
classifying cascades based on their temporal evolution [Yang and Leskovec 2011].
Other works build models of the underlying diffusion to then predict the final outcome.
In one such model, a shared piece of information is seen as a Poisson ‘arrival’ which
accumulates attention but simultaneously ages [Shen et al. 2014]. In another modeling
technique, each additional share contributes to the future probability of sharing [Zhao et al.
2015]. External influences can also be accounted for separately either as an additional point
of attention [Rizoiu et al. 2017] or an additional exposure curve that is essentially added to
the internal influence (Figure 0.3) [Myers, Zhu, and Leskovec 2012].
A further question is whether we can quantify the influence of specific. Identification
of influential nodes can be based on their position in the network and can use centrality
measures [Rusinowska et al. 2011] or estimated through optimization techniques [Kempe,
Kleinberg, and Tardos 2003; Li et al. 2013]. Such methods have application in a broad
array of fields such as transportation, urban networks, or disease propagation networks.
However, a few nodes alone are not responsible for shaping opinion in a network.
How is opinion shaped? Communication and information on networks also fulfills a
specific objective on the part of the content creator - to influence and convince the readers.
This can take the shape of advertisers trying to market their product or celebrities marketing
their brand, or news articles trying to shape the opinion of the public. We see that many
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individuals working together can lead to optimal outcomes, even if individually, they are
suboptimal [Degroot 1974; DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel 2003]. However, if certain
nodes are more influential or refuse to change their opinion, suboptimal situations (such
as disparate groups emerging) occur [Ghaderi and Srikant 2013; Bindel, Kleinberg, and
Oren 2011]. This series of works use simplified theoretical models to capture macroscopic
outcomes in the network.
What are the consequences on privacy? A potential consequence of information ex-
change for an individual can be a loss of privacy. Studies show that sparse data results in
individuals being increasingly easily identified. Mobility information, for instance, needs
approximately four locations to uniquely identify an individual [Montjoye et al. 2013].
Techniques exploiting several information sources can further erode privacy [Narayanan
and Shmatikov 2008; Narayanan and Shmatikov 2009]. In addition to identity, other infor-
mation about users of online services can be inferred from characteristic attributes [Sharma
et al. 2012; Mislove et al. 2010] to link creation times [Meeder et al. 2011].
0.2 Emerging Themes in Social Networks Research
Social networks datasets are massive and have complex relationships, both between par-
ticipants and between the different types of data. While this complexity can give rise to
new challenges in analysis, it also results in new opportunities. We outline some emerging
themes that take advantage of these inter-relationships.
0.2.1 Cross-Domain Analysis
These relationships act as connectors between different types of information, allowing
us to leverage data from different sources. Methods that exploit this feature often also
rely on data sparsity in general. A well-known example of this style technique is the
5
Figure 0.4: A anonymized mobile phone user by (A) location trace (B) as recorded by
database (C) at lowered (and more anonymous) resolution [Montjoye et al. 2013]
de-anonymization of the Netflix Prize dataset where the (anonymized) dataset of movies
and preferences were combined with user profiles and ratings from the Internet Movie
DataBase to identify a large fraction of the anonymous Netflix users [Narayanan and
Shmatikov 2008]. Another way to combine multiple information sources is to combine
two different networks and use structural information to transfer identities from one to an-
other[Narayanan and Shmatikov 2009; Narayanan, Shi, and Rubinstein 2011; Sharad and
Danezis 2014; Pedarsani and Grossglauser 2011].
Even within the same broader dataset, different types of information can be used to
great effect. For instance, spatial and temporal user information together were significantly
more informative than either alone (Figure 0.4) [Montjoye et al. 2013]. The overarching
question of this style of work is how to best utilize available sources of information to (a)
learn a new attribute about individuals in the network (b) understand its limits to design
sound mechanisms for data disclosure.
0.2.2 Network Structure and Information Flow
The complexity in interactions between participants in a network both influence and are
influenced by the intertwined and evolving network structure. A key question that current
research struggles with is modeling and predicting the flow of information in such a system,
as well as the biases that result.
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The network structure strongly affects how information is diffused online. For instance,
news typically reaches a large audience not directly but through intermediaries [Cha et al.
2012; Wu et al. 2011]. A side benefit of this type of diffusion is broadening the range of
opinions seen by a user [An et al. 2011]. In the context of social learning, the network
structure impacts the equilibria with stochastic networks resulting in favorable asymptotic
results [Bala and Goyal 1998; Acemoglu et al. 2011]. Further, the homogeneity of the user
preferences facilitates learning. The existence of more ‘forceful’ agents in the network
can result in the network as a whole not converging to a single value [Golub and Jackson
2010]. Structural features of the network (such as groups balanced in the information they
provide vs the information they obtain) can prevent such outcomes [Acemoglu, Ozdaglar,
and ParandehGheibi 2010].
Studying how user choice motivates link creation and network evolution gives us insight
into the other side of this dynamic. In the setting where players may create new links at
a fixed cost, these dynamics typically lead to extreme specialization [Galeotti and Goyal
2010]. Studies of large scale networks indicate that that individuals add edges in order to
complete triangles in the network [Leskovec et al. 2008]. Overall, macroscopic properties
of the network tend to be stable but locally, the networks are tend to be more unstable
[Watts 2006; Kumar, Novak, and Tomkins 2010].
0.3 The Cost to an Individual in a Social Network
Thus, we see that the cost to an individual in a social network can take on many flavors: loss
of privacy when they participate in online communication, decreased access to information
due to suboptimal network structure, or reduced sphere of influence from inferior network
position. In this thesis, we explore and develop techniques to exploit some of these features
and further examine how they arise.
We tackle two of the emerging themes of study (1) How can we leverage information
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exchanged across multiple domains to more effectively learn about the various domains?
and (2) How does the structure of the network affect the exchange of information? Note
that to address these themes, we employ a diversity of methodology inspired by previous
studies in social networks – quantifying and predicting features of the diffusion, reproduc-
ing certain aspects of the network, and modeling structure and communication within the
network.
In the course of the next several chapters, we show that:
• Even passive users of a social network can be deanonymized with at most 10 of their
clicks.
• User attention can be accurately predicted, even a day in advance, using noisy data.
• Producers of original content are a very specialized subset of the network. The prop-
erties of specialization (inequality in production) depend on spectral properties of the
network.
• Further, when the network is growing, this inequality of labor is exacerbated and
inequality can lead to persistent inequality.
0.3.1 Inference by Leveraging Cross-Domain Analyses
The first theme we examine is developing better inference techniques by leveraging knowl-
edge gained from combining several types of data – a technique we refer to as ‘cross do-
main analysis’. This style of analysis bridges the gap between multiple types of information
and allows us to infer features of the users or data. Earlier studies of social networks of-
ten independently studied and measured the various facets of the networks. Only recently
have researchers started taking advantage of the rich relationships between these indepen-
dently collected datasets through cross domain analysis techniques. This type of analysis
has become more popular with the increasing availability of large inter-connected datasets.




Social network users tend to feel secure about their privacy through the use of pseudonyms
and semi-anonymous user names. In order to ascertain whether there is a false sense of
security, we focus on a simple yet central problem: Can an independent first or third party
(respectively hosting content or serving ads) recognize a visitor as the owner of a profile
in social media? Leveraging cross-domain information from public twitter posts and rela-
tionships and click data seen only by the content host, we show that with relatively little
information, even a passive twitter user is identifiable. We find that the content that a user
receives on social media is highly distinguishable (in spite of the fact that most traffic is
only for a few popular articles). Leveraging this observation, we develop an original iden-
tification method which identifies users with a median of at most 10 clicks.
In this Chapter1, we address the following broad questions, with the goal of harnessing
publicly available information to learn private user-level information:
• How unique is a user’s content? (Section 1.1)
• How can we use a user’s uniqueness to deanonymize a user from their click behavior?
(Section 1.2)
Predicting User Attention
Social media attention is poorly measured – the raw information is often not available
publicly and few content publishers and social networks are willing to release such data.
Clicking behavior itself is information that is often private and hard to obtain. Usually, only
the website owner and the network itself has access to that information. In such cases, when
there is scarcity of data, we study how inference methods can applied to social networks to
sufficiently provide a substitute for user behavior.
We rely on a dataset from a content publisher which contains both private information
of several thousand posts and publicly available information from twitter on the conversa-
tion relating to those posts. We focus on the evolution of click generation over time. A
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key observation from these empirical analyses is that the process of click creation is a two
stage mechanism: from posting to impression (a view of a post) and impressions to clicks.
Further, we find that the factors affecting click dynamics time since posting, the posting
account and related graph structure, and the content quality behave almost independently
of each other. Equipped with this insight, we develop a two-stage model which accurately
predicted temporal clicks.
In Chapter 2, we study the following broad questions, with the goal of leverage publicly
available information to better estimate private content-level information:
• How does the publicly known information about shares and clicks relate to private
information available to a content publisher? How do these metrics evolve over the
life-cycle of a social media post? (Section 2.1)
• Can we leverage our observations to predict private information, such as the clicks a
link obtains? (Section 2.2)
0.3.2 Interaction in Information Flow and Perpetuation of Bias
Our second theme revolves around how information flows in a social network and the bi-
ases that result. One of their most dramatic consequences of social networks is the deluge
of information we consult before making any decisions. Natural questions that arise in
this context of news dissemination are “How is information introduced and propagated
through the social network and what are the resultant biases?” and “What types of net-
works growth and evolution guarantees everyone to eventually benefit from information
sharing?” At large scales of data, previously hidden dynamics begin to emerge as ob-
servable phenomenon that can be studied using data analysis and statistical techniques. In
social network services, such as Twitter and Facebook, the content that is produced and
exchanged behaves as a commodity of trade. As with any commodity, content acquisition
has both an associated cost and value.
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Factors affecting the valuation of content by an individual include quality, relevance to
interests, speed of receiving the content, and how it relates to their neighbors. In a con-
nected society with a sharing economy, each agent behaves so as to maximize their reward
to effort ratio. These agents’ choices are also affected by the choices of their neighbors in
the network. There is not a strict assignment of effort and reward but rather, this effort is
distributed across the network. We show that this redistribution has non-negligible effects.
Hence, the behavior of the complex network is the result of the actions (algorithms) that
each of these individuals follow.
Economic Models for Information Flow
While it is well-known that only a minority of participants in a network are active, we ex-
plore the setting of the introduction of original content into a network. Using data from
multiple online sources on Twitter, we show that this addition of original content remains
extremely concentrated. In fact, counter-intuitively, original content production is skewed
towards less active and connected people. Since the availability of news worth reading in
a social network exhibits the property of a public good, we develop a model that extends
public good theory from economics which correlates with the empirically observed activ-
ity. In this model, We build a model of information sharing where reward of reading and
searching for information is socialized. We show that specialization in content production
emerges even when players are ex ante identical, and this occurrence is related to spec-
tral properties of the social network and expiration time of the content when content is
long-lived, specialization is unavoidable!
In Chapter 3, we address the following broad questions, with the goal of understanding
how social networks function as a source of information:
• Who are the producers of original content in a social network? (Section 3.1)
• Can we develop a model to reproduce our observations? What are the implications
of such a model? (Section 3.2)
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Biases and Network Evolution
Building on this work, we focus on the dynamics of specialization in an evolving graph
with network interactions. The empirical results from simulations on a growing network
highlight the complex nature of information sharing. When the network expands and
hence more information get shared, a majority of nodes suffer on the short term, seeing
diminished accuracy and more individual effort. The benefits from information sharing
are skewed towards who appeared earlier (hence more connected); new arrivals and other
nodes with smaller degrees benefit much less. The theoretical analysis further establishes
the connection between large unbalanced communities and the failure of information shar-
ing to benefit everyone. While, in the worst case, this can result in degenerate equilibria, we
show that small deviations from the worst case are enough to allow all players to contribute
and gain from the network.
In Chapter 4, we address the following broad questions, with the goal of understanding
how evolving networks change the dynamics of information sharing:
• How do users in an evolving graph behave when seeking to preserve privacy in the
information they share? Do users gain from greater access to information through
their network of friends? (Section 4.2)
• Can we replicate our observations with models? (Section 4.3)
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Definitions
Social Network An online platform where individuals can share text, media or links and
build relationships with other users in the platform. The underlying network can
be directed or undirected depending on the platform used. E.g. Twitter, Facebook,
Instagram
Share A link or url that has been posted (or reposted) by a user of social media. This is
used interchangeably with ‘post’ and ‘tweet’.
Content The substance that is shared by an individual on social networks. In the context
of this thesis, we focus on content that pertains to articles shared i.e., the text of the
content shared should contain a URL linking to a longer form article.
Follower An edge in a social media graph. In an undirected social network (such as Face-
book), both users confirm the relationship and receive content that they share. In
a directed social network (such as Twitter or Instagram), the follower chooses to
receive all the content shared by the individual they are following. This is used in-
terchangeably with ‘relationship’ and ‘edge’.
Impression An impression occurs each time content is fetched from its source, and is thus
countable. This is typically data that is private and available only to the publisher
of the content and the network itself. This is a standard metric used to measure
popularity of a particular post.
Reception A potential audience member of a post. These are users who will potentially
view a post. Formally receptions =
∑
i∈users sharing a post number of followers of i
13
Click The selection of a link on a post. This is a conscious action online and can be used
as a measure of interest in the post or topic.
Producer An individual sharing content on social media. Such individuals are responsible
for producing the content consumed by others on the network.
Conversation The exchange of information among many individuals online. In a medium
such as Twitter, the conversation comprises of the tweets and the retweets that follow.
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Data
In this dissertation, I use the following datasets for the analyses:
NYTIMES The NYTIMES dataset contains all the Twitter posts containing a URL from
the nytimes.com domain during a full week of December 2011 [May et al. 2014]. In par-
allel, we crawled the follower-followee relationship at the same time in order to construct
the URLs that each user re- ceived. The final dataset totals 346k unique users receiving a
total 22m tweets with URL (including multiplicity). Of these, there are 70k unique links.
All the data in this dataset is publicly available. This dataset is used for study in chapters
1, 3, and 4.
KAIST The KAIST dataset contains the entire Twitter graph from August 2009 and con-
sists of 8m users and 700m links [Cha et al. 2012] . Taken over the course of a month, the
dataset contains 183m tweets. Of these tweets, we considered only those with urls (37m)
since those are the tweets that provide an indication of sharing media on twitter. All the
data in this dataset is publicly available. This dataset is used for study in chapter 1.
KAIST-NEWS In order to better study news articles, we filtered the tweets in KAIST by
news domains (e.g., , cnn.com). The classification of a domain as news was obtained from
the Open Directory Project (http://www.dmoz.org/), a volunteer edited directly of
Web links. Each link in the directory is annotated with a top level categories and multiple
levels of subcategories. In our analysis, we only took into account the top level category.
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We kept all the domains with a reasonable number of posts (> 2000 posts) resulting in 31
domains. We removed domains which did not seem to follow the same definition of news
as others (aggregators such as e.g. news.google.com and reddit.com, weather
services such as weather.gov, and region specific domains such as thehindu.com).
All the data in this dataset is publicly available. This dataset is used for study in chapter 3.
DIGG Within KAIST, we focused on the domain digg.com (DIGG). This dataset consists
of 216k unique URLs tweeted by 44k unique users. These users represent the population
that displays some interest in the domain. Hence, the as- sociated network is derived from
the 52m links connecting these individuals. All the data in this dataset is publicly available.
This dataset is used for study in chapter 1.
BUZZFEED+ This dataset consists of data combined from three sources. This dataset is
used for study in chapter 2.
Publisher Dataset BuzzFeed is an internet media company focussing on creation and
distribution of content. They cover a wide range of topics across multiple platforms. On
Twitter, they have ∼ 40 active posting accounts, each targeted to a different demographic.
As a publisher on Twitter, they have access to Twitter Analytics of their account, including
the hourly metrics of link clicks, retweets, and impressions. These metrics gives us more
granular data of the readership of an account. We leveraged these hourly analytics for
BuzzFeed Twitter accounts which include links to www.buzzfeed.com content. We
focused on original tweets, excluding retweets, in order to preserve uniformity of content
source.
Our dataset includes all original tweets published by any of BuzzFeed’s Twitter ac-
counts over a 7-day period from August 3 to 17, 2016 (4K tweets). The largest account is
BuzzFeed’s primary, eponymous account, which has 2.8M followers. This account posts a
wide variety of links to BuzzFeed web articles, typically those projected to become most
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viral. The next most popular account is BuzzFeedNews, with 470K followers, which posts
links to traditional news stories published by BuzzFeed. The remaining accounts serve a
more specific niche or content genre, and are named accordingly (e.g. BuzzFeedSports,
BuzzFeedFashion).
While some of the data from this dataset is accessible by the public (the tweets posted
by BuzzFeed), the Twitter Analytics data is private and is only seen by BuzzFeed and
Twitter.
Retweet Dataset We used Twitter’s REST API to scrape all tweets published by Buz-
zFeed accounts and all related public retweets over the span of the same 7 days, forming
a complete public dataset of the BuzzFeed tweets. Each (re)tweet also provides the pub-
licly available follower count of the (re)tweeting user. This part of the dataset is publicly
accessible.
Clicks Dataset To further supplement our public readership data, we used bit.ly’s
API to gather all twitter-originating link clicks (those with twitter.com or t.co as
the listed referrer domain). We collected data for the hour periods of hours 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 −
8, 9 − 12, 13 − 24. Of the 4K original tweets published during that 7-day range (Aug 3
- 17, 2016), we considered only those that contained bit.ly URLs, and completed a 24-
hour lifecycle within the date range ( 1.4K tweets). Note that most BuzzFeed accounts
almost exclusively used one method of sharing information (either using bit.ly for almost
all the links they post via the official bzfd.it shortener, or not at all). As a result, focusing
on bit.ly links introduces a source-bias since accounts behave differently. However, we
believe there is little intrinsic bias introduced by bit.ly itself. This part of the dataset is
publicly accessible.
Broad News Domains Dataset We include comparisons of overall dynamics to other
news sources in order to validate our use of buzzfeed.com. This dataset contains the
17
hourly posts, receptions and bit.ly clicks for five major news sources, from both Twitter
and bit.ly [Gabielkov et al. 2016].
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Chapter 1
Social Media + Clicks = Identity
Our first study examines the potential of public information to break pseudo-anonymous
identity. Pseudo-anonymous identities are common in social networks where a user might
not use their real name or information but they will use consistent profiles for their social
media presence. The use of such pseudo-anonymous identities on social networks gives
users a sense of security about their online presence. Increasingly, there has been develop-
ment of methods to break this anonymity. Often these techniques rely on some universal
connecting information and exploit sparsity in data in general [Narayanan and Shmatikov
2008; Narayanan and Shmatikov 2009; Montjoye et al. 2013] to identify or infer infor-
mation about users of online services, and social media in particular [Sharma et al. 2012;
Meeder et al. 2011; Mislove et al. 2010].
Most of the work on social media centers on a user’s explicit activity with regard to
one or several social network providers, and occasionally on how this leaks information
between or beyond them. In contrast, implicit activities such as clicks and reads are under-
explored. They are typically much harder to study: only providers of social networks have
access to individual data about them, and they rarely reveal it for privacy and commer-
cial reasons. Studying implicit activities requires bridging two worlds: Content producers
maintain a detailed user profile for personalization and ads using cookies, but a priori have
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no information about the user outside their domain. Social media usually have a wider
view of someone’s interest, but may lack detailed information about a user in a domain.
We focus on a simple yet central problem: “Can an independent first or third party
(respectively hosting content or serving ads) recognizes a visitor as the owner of a profile
in social media?”
In addition to research on deanonymization, our results complement previous studies of
cascades and information diffusion in social media [Cha et al. 2010; Kwak et al. 2010; An
et al. 2011; Rodrigues et al. 2011; Cha et al. 2012; Wu et al. 2011; Goel, Watts, and Gold-
stein 2012]. Indeed, measuring and predicting the success of a cascade is still a matter of
controversy [Cha et al. 2010; Bakshy et al. 2011]. Validating those studies with individual
data about which users clicked which links sent by whom requires data unavailable out-
side researchers at social media provider [Bosagh Zadeh et al. 2013; Bakshy et al. 2012].
This study opens an alternative way, by inferring visitors from web traffic, to study the real
success of social media in generating clicks.
What sets us apart from previous work is that our work exploits basic ingredients, com-
mon to any web-domain. Hence, our results apply more generally: Whenever a user fol-
lows information from a public social media such as Twitter she is instantly recognizable
by the website she visits unless she (1) has not visited this domain more than 4 times, (2)
takes action not to be appearing as the same visitor, or (3) creates multiple identities, makes
her list of connections private, or delays her visits by a non-negligible time. While each of
these actions or situations are deemed possible, they significantly limit a user’s web expe-
rience. In contrast with previous work, we assume no cooperation of any sort. We assume
simply first party tracking: the provider can maintain a persistent identity for web visitor
only within its domain. We assume that the domain knows only one thing: that the click
was generated through a social media site (e.g., from twitter.com).
In this chapter, we make the following contributions:
• We first unearth a critical fact: Although links shared on social media exhibit ex-
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tremely skewed popularity distribution with a few receiving the most attention, the
content a user receives is highly distinguishable. (§ 1.1)
• We design an original identification method which identifies users with a median of
≤ 10 clicks. This method, however, is limited in its applicability to small domains
with very low click rates. To address the most challenging cases, we introduce an
extension of the baseline method, using recent work on influence inference. When
inference is accurate, the method promises identification in less than 4 or 5 clicks.
(§ 1.2)
1.1 Uniqueness of social media users
Previous results reported that four spatio-temporal points are enough to uniquely identify
96% of the individuals in large anonymous mobility datasets[Montjoye et al. 2013]. Simi-
larly, records from the Netflix prize revealed that most of the time the set of items rated by
a user overlaps with less than half of those from the closest users in these data [Narayanan
and Shmatikov 2008]. Similarly, we ask here: “How unique is the set of people you follow
and the content you receive from them?”
How unique is the content you receive? Our first and most striking result is that users
overwhelmingly receive a unique set of URLs. This is in spite that the majority of users
receive few of them (e.g., in NYT half of them receives less than 15 distinct URLs) and that
URLs are concentrated on a few blockbuster links that are essentially received by everyone
(e.g., the top-15 URLs account together for 7% of all the tweets).
Figure 1.1 shows, for users who received more than n URLs, what fraction of them
have a unique subset (i.e. one that no other user received). Note that, alternatively, when
no more than k ≥ 1 users receive this subset, we say the user is k-anonymous, and plot the
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Figure 1.1: Fraction of social media users receiving more than nURLs, and those receiving
a unique sets of URLs among them.
DIGG. One observes that 15 URLs appears to be a turning point, below which threshold, a
user is rarely distinguished by its set of URLs.
Note that we considered a user uniquely identified only if it is the only one that receives
these URLs or a superset of them1. This property is stronger and makes this result more
surprising given that some users received an enormous amount of information from the
nytimes.com domain (we had more than 10 users receiving above 5,000 URLs each).
The unicity property of your set of URLs is derived from the long-tail property of the

















































Figure 1.2: Fraction of user
with at least n active friends,
and those for which this set
is unique.
distribution [Goel et al. 2010]. According to this property, a very large fraction of the
content you receive is common, while some items will be highly specific. The occurrence
of one of these items (which is likely unless your set of received URLs is very small) is
sufficient to offer information that makes you distinct.
How unique are the set of people you follow? Given that the links that form your social
media news feed are a direct consequence of the person you follow and their posts, it does
not come as a surprise that this set of “friends” (as Twitter terminology refers to them) is
unique. What is perhaps less obvious is that this set of friends distinguishes you even more
than your content.
To measure that effect, we run a similar experiment on the New York Time dataset
and find that knowing who contributed to your feed distinguish you with overwhelming
probability, even against supersets as discussed before. This translate into almost 70% of
the users being unique in that regard; those users amount to 96% of the potential traffic to
nytimes.com. In effect, knowing a small subset of your posting friends almost always
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makes you a unique person.
To confirm that this effect is not an artifact of specific structures on Twitter, we run a
similar experiment on a surrogate social media, reshuffling at random the edges of bipartite
graph, while maintaining the overall friend and popularity distributions (Figure 1.2).
These results highlight a new promising application of sparsity methods to identify
social media users, which is based on the content that they receive and the individuals
participating in it. We have shown that this has a high potential, as a very large fraction
of the users, and overwhelming percentage of the traffic, is created by visitors with unique
patterns. It remains to be seen how these facts can come together to constitute a proper and
practical re-identification method for the web.
1.2 Deanonymization Algorithm and Select Findings
We have shown that content received on social media is highly distinctive. We now study
several methods leveraging this fact, to allow a web domain receiving visits from social me-
dia to identify their visitors explicitly. They are multiple motivations for a domain owner to
do that: learning additional information about its audience (demographics, interests, trend-
ing topics), monitoring the content its users receive from competitors, or even personalize
your results (with or without user’s knowledge) based on a visitor’s inferred social media
profile.
Currently, there are three ways to identify your visitors: asking for users to sign in using
the social network service, asking social media providers to reveal a user’s identity when-
ever she clicks on this domain, or asking a web-aggregator to perform synchronization.
Each is cumbersome as it poses usability concerns (e.g., your visitors may leave or even
lie if asked to provide a form of identification) and assumes cooperation (e.g., a social net-
work provider or web-aggregator may not want to reveal their users’ identity to a domain,
a domain may not want to reveal its audience to them). In contrast with previous work, we
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assume no cooperation of any sort. We aim at an identification scheme that bypasses all
mechanisms mentioned above.
1.2.1 The state of web-tracking
Web content publishers or third parties generally keep track of web visitors to inform per-
sonalization, targeted advertisement and general audience analytics. There is a clear ten-
dency to aggregate identities for a user across domains, making it ever more difficult to
evade tracking [Roesner, Kohno, and Wetherall 2012]. The result is the rise of web ag-
gregators, a large class of services who typically observe a user’s web itinerary on a large
fraction of the web [Gill et al. 2013]. The HTTP protocol allows us to aggregate identi-
ties: A single web page (e.g., an article on nytimes.com) generates requests to multiples
domains (e.g., admob.com, facebook.com, twitter.com), each one keeping a
local user identity. Since browser only blocks set-cookies in HTTP response – if they
block third party at all – it means the user is recognized unless it was never called before
in a first party transactions, a relatively rare case. Ad-networks allow cookies synchro-
nization [Olejnik, Minh-Dung, and Castelluccia 2014], further extending the reach of third
party tracking. Evasion techniques exist, such as stronger third-party cookies blocking or
reset, but each is met with an alternative forms of tracking: 1x1 pixel image forcing third
party request, malicious use of web caching to provide pseudo identifiers in the Etag field,
Flash cookies [Ayenson et al. 2011], or use of Browser Fingerprinting and Javascript [Eck-
ersley 2010].
Our assumptions, discussed immediately below, leverages common facts on tracking
with no third party cooperation.
1.2.2 Problem Formulation & Assumptions
We assume simply first party tracking: the provider can maintain a persistent identity for
web visitor only within its domain. This applies to content publishers (e.g., nytimes.com).
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This also captures aggregators who do not have such limitations (e.g., admob.com,
bluekai.com) by extending the domain considered to all those they can track.
In both cases, we assume that the domain knows only one thing: that the click was
generated through a social media site (e.g., from twitter.com). We note that this is
commonly done today (e.g., nytimes.com limits non-subscribers to 10 articles a month,
but allow unlimited access from social media) in multiple ways: most commonly the HTTP
referrer field2, or by providing specific URLs to use in various social media. We do not
assume, however, that the URL itself is indicative of which posts, tweets, or mention gen-
erated that click. It is sometimes possible to leverage that fact and make our method even
more efficient, but we ignore it here. Note, however, that we assume that all clicks a user
generates on the social media (e.g., from twitter.com) comes from her feed and not
search or special content promotion. We believe this would affect our results in the same
way as attribution errors (see § 1.2 for more on that topic).
We assume that, in parallel, the domain also monitors who post links to its content in
the social media. It seems legitimate as “active” users posting links expect it to be publicly
known. Again, it’s commonly done especially to promote a domain by retweeting users
and celebrities mentioning its content or to follow what is said about the domain. Our
last assumption is that the domain owner is able to access the graph of followers of each
“active” users mentioning URLs from their domain. To simplify we first assume that this
information is prior knowledge, but later on we discuss how to limit how much of that
information is needed.
These assumptions are inspired from information made publicly available by Twitter.
Our methods would extend to other social media with similar policies.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of
the number of visits needed
to successfully re-identify a
node as a function of the size
of its receiving URLs set.
1.2.3 A simple method for re-identification
Given what we have learned about content received on social media, the following scheme
is promising: In the first phase, for every URL in the domain, collect the set of people who
received it in the social media (i.e., the union of followers of “active” users who post it). In
the second phase, for each visitor, collect URLs of all her HTTP requests generated from
this social media, and intersect the URLs’ received sets. This method can safely conclude
the identity of this visitor when this intersection contains a single node.
Our preliminary analysis suggests this method terminates, as each user often is the
unique node intersecting all the URLs she receives. But this raised two questions: How
many URLs from each user are needed to reach this conclusion? As a consequence, how
likely is this method to complete when only a subset of the content a user receive generates
a click to that domain?
Figure 1.3 presents the results of a simulation where for each user in our dataset we
look at URLs included one by one in random order and stop whenever the intersecting set
is a singleton. Across the whole population the median user is identified after 8 URLs, and
even for large sets 10 URLs suffice on average.
In real life, however, an intersection step occurs when a user decides to clicks, and
only a fraction of URLs received generate a HTTP request. In addition, some URLs may
receive more clicks as they are simply more interesting. To account for that, we built the
following click generation model: Many links were published using the URL shortener
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Figure 1.4: Fraction of users with at least n URLs received, and the proportion that are
identified for various click generation rates and two methods.
bit.ly, and we use this API to obtain the number of clicks that each of those URLs
generated. Dividing by the number of times this URLs is received in our dataset yields
for each URL a coefficient. We scaled these coefficients by a constant so that the effective
Click-Through-Rate (CTR) experienced by URLs posted on Twitter is 1%, 2%, 5% and
10% overall, chosen to represent a range of plausible hypotheses on CTR [Richardson,
Dominowska, and Ragno 2007; Zhang et al. 2011]. Note that our method is approximate
(i.e., the measured clicks may be generated through other sources than Twitter), but it still
captures heterogeneous popularity of URLs, most notably that rare URLs are less likely to
generate click, under normalized conditions.
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Figure 1.4 shows the fraction of users identified with the intersection method, assuming
our click generation model. The qualitative trend is not surprising, the identifiability of a
node depends on the number of URLs it clicks and is also inversely proportional to the
click rate. If one out of twenty URLs get clicked, we can successfully identify 40% of
the traffic, and for a CTR of 1%, more than 99% are users are left unidentified, since the
success probably is low for anyone unless they receive at least 1,500 URLs.
1.2.4 Refining attribution with time information
Our next method is inspired by recent advances to use time in the inference of links and
diffusion on social media [Gomez-Rodriguez, Leskovec, and Krause 2012; Rodriguez,
Leskovec, and Scho¨lkopf 2013]. Leveraging the fact that most clicks occur within a very
short time of the URLs being posted, one can reconstruct minimal graphs to account for
the visit times using convex optimization techniques. These rely on the time differences
between visits of users to estimate probabilities of follower relationships existing among
them. The intuition is that visits that are closer together in time are more likely to be related
to each other in the social graph.
Another recent development thats helps in attribution is the adoption and use of diffu-
sion tracking mechanisms such as BuzzFeed’s pound system [Goldstein, Goel, and Watts
2015]. In such systems, each individual sharing a link has some code associated with their
link which, when combined with timing information, allows us to attribute a click to an
individual sharing online.
In our analyses, we use an idealized form of attribution where we assume either perfect
attribution (which could be done through one of the means describe above) or attribution
with errors.
We now utilize a method, Remember-Attribute-Intersect (RAI) (Algorithm 1), a three
phase algorithm which uses methods of influence detection to attribute URLs to their social
media source. While simulating the entire inference relies on information about click times,
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which is difficult to obtain and beyond the scope of this study, we conduct simulation
assuming that the attribution steps succeeds with some probability in finding the source, or
otherwise introduces an attribution error.
ALGORITHM 1: Intersect Algorithm of RAI
Data: Social Network G(V,E): Node v ∈ V ; URLs visited u ∈ URLs(v)
Result: I(v) = identity of v; f ⊆ Friends(v) used for re-identification
Identities(v)← V ;
while Identities(v) > 1 and ∃ URL visit u do
I(v)← (∪f post u & v visits u via fFollowers(f)) ∩ I(v);
u← next visited URL;
end
if Length(Identities(v)) 6= 1 then // no unique identity found
while Length(I(v)) > 1 and ∃ URL visit u do
I(v)← (∪f post uFollowers(f)) ∩ I(v);
u← next visited URL;
end
end
Results with perfect attribution
We applied our method to NYT and recovered a significant fraction of the individuals.
Figure 1.4 compares the performance of the two methods – the baseline method using just
URLs and the modified RAI method with various CTRs. We see that there is a significant
advantage in using attribution over the baseline. Even at low clicks rates of 1% and 5%,
we capture individuals receiving only 100 URLs, which is a more typical user.
When we examined characteristics of the individuals used for re-identification, we find
that the the set of individuals useful in identification were not significantly less popular
than the others, indicating that our method does not rely on the inactive and less detectable
individuals.
Effect of attribution error
All of our previous analysis assume that the attribution of URLs works perfectly. However,
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followers for active friends
used in re-identification.
certain error rate, we randomly attribute a URL incorrectly to another user who also posted
that URL. Note that the set of URLs received by a web visitor is always correct under the
persistence assumption. We then run a modified version of RAI. With incorrect attribution,
it is possible that the intersection of followers of the attributed sources are not consistent
and lead to no possible identifications. In that case, we back off, and run our initial URL
re-identification method which is not susceptible to errors.
Figure 1.6 presents the results of RAI under error rates ranging from 5% to 45%, assum-
ing a 5% uniform click through rate. The performance of RAI with errors falls somewhere
between the two methods with perfect information. Indeed, for individuals receiving more
than 1000 URLs, the performance is virtually unaffected by errors. In most cases, there are
still gains in individuals identified with attribution which were previously not possibly by
the URLs alone.
Table 1.1 shows the overall percentages of visits and people re-identified with both
methods with varying CTRs and error rates. In a perfect information scenario, we can
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Figure 1.6: Fraction of nodes identified with attribution errors for two CTRs.
account for 97% of the visits. Even in more restrictive scenarios, with 5% CTR and sig-
nificant error, we can account for about half of the visits and almost 20% of the whole
population.
1.3 Conclusion
Limitations While the method we describe is applicable by many content publishers and
aggregators, the method relies on certain assumptions.
Firstly, our method relies on identities being persistent over the time period being ex-
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Error CTR
Rate 100% 30% 5% 1%
(a) 0%
% visits 97.0% 91.9% 70.3% 31.7%
% visitors 69.1% 49.3% 19.5% 3.7%
(a) 5%
% visits 91.5% 83.1% 59.4%
% visitors 60.8% 43.4% 18.1%
(false. pos.) (8.5%) (8.8%) (5.7%)
(a) 20%
% visits 89.5% 77.9% 47.6%
% visitors 52.6% 34.2% 11.9%
(false. pos.) (15.9%) (18.1%) (15.1%)
(b) N/A
% visits 91.0% 79.2% 43.8% 11.8%
% visitors 53.7% 30.5% 7.9% 0.8%
Table 1.1: Fraction of visits and visitors identified by (a) attributed URLs with varying
error rates, and (b) unattributed URLs, for different CTRs.
amined. In Section 1.2, we covered some of the means to do so. Some of the situations in
which this might not hold (and thus our method will fail) include a content publisher not
tracking anonymous users by any means or a content aggregator not combining behavior
from multiple sources.
Secondly, our analysis relies on observing posting behavior over a sufficient period
of time. We found that a week was sufficient for a domain such as nytimes.com or
digg.com. More generally our experiments indicate that one would need to collect
enough data so that most users receive at least 8 posts. This might not apply in some
situations (e.g., very new websites, very unpopular sites, domains that are relevant only for
a short period of time).
Thirdly, we require that the content publisher crawls or otherwise obtains the associated
social graph for that time period. For content providers invested in an analysis of their
audience, this does not prove to be a major impediment but can be resource and time
intensive. Since the intersection method use simple operations, it could be run on a selective
set of URLs (e.g., , ignoring the most popular ones posted many times) or to re-identify only
some particular set of visitors. Both of these cases may reduce the cost of this step.
Lastly, we assume that clicks are generated from users of twitter.com via their
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feed and not through other means (e.g., search or promoted content). If the latter occurs
occasionally, one might detect that as an attribution error, ignoring that URLs and applying
the method on the rest
Prevention The limitations of our method also give rise to potential avenues of preven-
tion of such an attack.
As a user, the most straightforward means to prevent this type of attribution attack is
simply to use private browsing or some other means to break the condition of a persistent
id. Private browsing typically does not store cookies (an easy way for a content publisher
to have persistent local identity). A more extreme form would be to use public computers
or to use an operating system that does not store state (such as Puppy Linux).
Since the method relies on having access to the relationships in the social network, one
can also prevent this attack by relying on those networks which are predominantly private
(e.g., Facebook) or by ensuring that all the user’s friends are private and not visible to a
public crawl.
A more costly preventive mechanism is one in which the user carefully builds their
social relationships such that they are indistinguishable from other individuals. However,
this doesn’t provide perfect protection as they would only be K-anonymous where K is the
number of individuals who have identical relationships.
If the user is only particular about certain types of behavior being exposed, he could
also create different accounts (and therefore different social relationships) associated with
different types of consumption. For example, creating three separate profiles to access
content by news media, celebrities, and personal friends.
With this technique, we show that even passive interactions with public conversation
can broadly identify an individual. Even with its limitation, preventing such attacks require
investment on the part of the user.
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Chapter 2
Click Inference from Public and Private
data
When available data is lacking, inference methods applied to social networks can prove to
be especially useful. In the previous chapter, we saw this applied in the context of identity.
Here, we examine the realm of understanding how links distributed on social media gener-
ate web traffic, or clicks. Progress on this essential question was essentially halted by lack
of publicly available data. With the confidentiality of large-scale individual-level data on
social media click habits, one can only hope to study this problem with aggregate data.
A common motivation of our work and several others is to study propagation to quantify
influence online [Cha et al. 2010; Bakshy et al. 2011], how news sharing is affected by
social networks [An et al. 2011; An et al. 2014], and various mechanisms and drivers
behind retweeting links [Kwak et al. 2010; Boyd, Golder, and Lotan 2010]. Our work
complements this line of work as it makes it possible to analyze reading habits, which was
previously ignored. Most prior studies of online clicking habits are specifically targeted
at online advertising. Models attempt at measuring the quality of an ad, and the relevance
of personalization using its Click-Through-Rate (CTR) a metric resembling CPI in our
context [Farahat and Bailey 2012; McMahan et al. 2013].
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However, we show in this chapter that publicly available data is sufficient in elucidat-
ing the process of click conversion on social media. Here we leverage recent methods to
simultaneously study shares and clicks on Twitter from a leading news domain using pub-
licly available data only. Our goal is to describe and predict click dynamics for the entire
lifespan of a URL posted on social media. We show that even with this scarcity of data, a
dynamic prediction model that does not use this proprietary information can leverage the
invariant properties of each step to its benefit and lead to accurate and fast prediction of
clicks. In this section, we present the following contributions:
• We decouple the process of click creation into two separate stages: from posting
to impression and impressions to clicks. This process involves measuring social
media impressions – a metric that is generally not observable. We then continue and
describe the temporal dynamics of both stages identified above. We find that the
click dynamics are affected by time, the posting account, and the content in ways in
which these factors remain seemingly independent of each other. (§2.1)
• Equipped with this insight, we develop a model which predicts temporal impressions,
and then temporal clicks from those impression predictions. (§2.2)
Much of the prediction literature focuses on predicting the sharing behavior and cas-
cade size. This direction follows an implicit assumption that content popularity by number
of user shares and attributions can serve as a proxy for popularity by clicks. Some of the
prediction methods are based on better modeling the underlying process by accounting for
external influence [Myers, Zhu, and Leskovec 2012; Rizoiu et al. 2017] or using more
complex models for the underlying diffusion [Shen et al. 2014; Zhao et al. 2015; Altman
2015]. Other methods evaluate the use of different types of features, of which the most
useful features for prediction are time-based features. This time component can be differ-
ently accounted for by including a Bayesian approach [Zaman, Fox, and Bradlow 2014],
reformulating the problem into several stages [Cheng et al. 2014], and classifying cascades
based on their temporal evolution [Yang and Leskovec 2011]. Our work builds on this idea,
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further validating the use of time-based features. Another type of question asked in pre-
diction literature is how much early success is indicative of longer range success and how
much early information is needed [Szabo and Huberman 2010]. Our method further push
the limits on the early information needed by relying on only the first hour of information.
Further, our work takes into account the next crucial phase of the information flow – how
do those shares relate to the clicks a link receives?
2.1 Understanding Click Dynamics
For online content, the click through rate (CTR) is defined as the probability that a reader
clicks on the link when that it is shown to her. It has been studied and used in multiple
applications including models of web surfing [Hubert, Hubert, and Mugizi 2006], ranking
of search results [Chebolu and Melsted 2008], and optimization of online ads [Richardson,
Dominowska, and Ragno 2007; Farahat and Bailey 2012]. With public access to impres-
sion data being limited, we introduce two new definitions for CTR:
• Clicks Per Impression (CPI): # clicks
# impressions
• Clicks Per Reception (CPR): # clicks∑
u∈U #followers(u)
where U = the set of users tweeting
or retweeting the link. Here we count one reception for each Twitter users who are
potentially exposed to a tweet (i.e., who follow an account that shared the URLs).
The main difference between the two metrics is the computation of audience size. CPI
is the traditionally used metric to evaluate click through rate. With CPI, we consider the
audience as the number of Twitter users who have been exposed to the URL, or the number
of impressions. While this is an accurate measurement of CTR, it is often hard to measure
with public data. In contrast, for CPR, the audience to be the number of receptions. This
method can overestimate the number of impressions and capture too much noise since
number of receptions fails to account for 1) the overlap of follower sets and 2) the level of
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Figure 2.1: Clicks per Re-
ception (Red) and Clicks per
Impression (Blue). CPI is
computed from the publisher
dataset. CPR is computed en-
tirely from public data.
activity of followers. While one can theoretically compute the number of unique receptions
to account for overlap, the number of API queries involved quickly makes this prohibitively
expensive. Previous work quantified this overestimation from overlap, finding it is less than
20% for 75% of reception counts [Gabielkov et al. 2016].
Figure 2.1 compares the ecdf distributions of CPI and CPR for each URL. Note that
CPI is computed from our publisher dataset and CPR is computed entirely from public
data: the number of clicks from bit.ly, and the number of receptions from Twitter. While
the magnitudes of CPI and CPR differ by a factor, they follow the same general trend.
The Effects of Retweeting on Clicks Click rate metrics give an overall view into the per-
formance of a URL. However they miss insight into the cause of the readership of content
- its diffusion and sharing characteristics. We would expect that retweeting features bear a
strong relationship to the audience and the eventual readership since the act of retweeting
is the primary mechanism to generate an audience. This type of analysis is relatively new
with the work of Gabielkov et al. being the first to examine this relationship [Gabielkov
et al. 2016]. They found that there was a strong positive correlation between the number
of retweets of a link and the number of clicks. We expand on their work by examining
the relationship in content of different audience sizes with a broader set of type of content,
rather than traditional news alone.
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Figure 2.2: The effect of sharing on clicks and impressions, at different sharing magni-
tudes. (top) Retweets ≤ 100 show a strong positive correlation in both clicks and impres-
sions while (bottom) Retweets > 100 show a positive correlation in impressions, but no
correlation in clicks.
In these analyses, we use publicly attained retweets, estimated impressions, estimated
clicks, and the estimated clicks per impression to analyze the relation of clicks and click
rate with share rate.
We first found that the relationship between retweeting and CPI demonstrates a law of
diminishing returns of clicks, as it has a slight negative correlation (Pearson’s r = −0.063,
p value= 7.582e − 10). However, looking into the relationship between retweets and
absolute number of clicks presents another picture of the effect of endorsements on news
item reach on Twitter. Here the results suggests a law of no returns. While this limit on
reach has been previously observed in social media, those studies are based in a different
39
Figure 2.3: Trajectory plot
for a single URL with clicks
on the y-axis and impres-
sions on the x-axis. The
colored points indicating the
time of the measurement.
setting, and define reach by re-shares rather than clicks [Myers, Zhu, and Leskovec 2012].
We see a threshold effect at ∼ 100 retweets, above which the clicking and sharing
relationship changes. When number of retweets is < 100 (Figure 2.2 (top)), clicks and
shares are positively correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.55). However, past this threshold, in-
creasing retweets does not translate to increasing clicks (Figure 2.2 (bottom)) (Pearson’s
r = 0.120). A diminishing impression rate could explain this exhaustion of reach, but not
entirely. While the growth rate of impressions diminishes, impressions do still increase
with sharing with a Pearson’s r = 0.64 (Figure 2.2 (bottom)). Unlike clicks, we don’t yet
observe a limit to the growth of impressions in our scope of sharing magnitude.
Given the complex relationship between posts and clicks or impressions, we cannot use
a straightforward model to estimate the number of clicks (or even impressions) from easily
available public posting data. Indeed, we see in the next section that when you consider the
evolution of a tweet over its lifetime, that relationship is further complicated.
2.1.1 Evolution of Clicks
To better understand the relationship between posting behavior and clicks or impressions,
we study the evolution of the characteristics of a link evolve. Figure 2.3 show a sample
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Figure 2.4: Trajectory plot
for each URL with clicks
on the y-axis and impres-
sions on the x-axis. Each
line represents a single URL
with the colored points in-
dicating the time of the
measurement.
trajectory plot for a single URL for clarity. The black line represents a URL with each
point representing a different point in time (in hours). The lighter points are earlier and the
darker points are later in the URL’s lifetime. The x-axis is the cumulative impressions (or
receptions) in log-scale. The y-axis is the cumulative observed clicks in log-scale. While
we expect to see the increasing trend (since it is cumulative), it is interesting to note the
near linearity (in log-scale).
We see this bear out in the full dataset. The full trajectory plot presents a map of
the the evolution of each URL (Figure 2.4). In the impressions trajectory plot (left), we
observe that most of the trajectories are roughly linear and run roughly parallel to each
other, indicating a close linear relationship between the two quantities.
We observe some level of clustering with URLs with similar audience size (on the x-
axis). For instance, there is a large group of URLs which reach an initial audience of 10k.
These URLs are shared by the BuzzFeed main account. The different clusters roughly
correspond to the different BuzzFeed accounts and we can see that overall, they exhibit
similar behavior.
We also notice that, even among the URLs with the same number of impressions, there
is a very wide range of clicks. We see that each URL seems to have its own specific CPI,
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Figure 2.5: Trajectory plot
for each URL with clicks on
the y-axis and receptions on
the x-axis. Each line repre-
sents a single URL with the
colored points indicating the
time of the measurement.
Figure 2.6: Clicks per Re-
ception (Blue) and Clicks
per Impression (Red) or-
dered by the time period.
CPI is relatively stable over
time, while CPR shows
some increase.
as evidenced by the stacked trajectories. Within a single account, the shared URLs have
very similar sharing characteristics (and thus, similar number of impressions). However,
there is a wide range of about an order of magnitude of the number of clicks that the same
number of impressions translates to. This CPI seems to be content-based, i.e., some URLs
will intrinsically perform better than others.
Similar analyses using receptions instead of impressions show a staggering difference
2.5. This difference stems from the way impressions and receptions are measured - im-
pressions are measured at the time of viewing a link whereas receptions are measured at
the time of posting a link.
In addition to the raw clicks and impressions, we consider the distribution of CPR
and CPI as it changes with time (Figure 2.6). Each box represents the distribution of the
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CTR metric in that time period. While CPR shows a definite increase with time, CPI is
more stable. This stability confirms, as did Figure 2.4 (left), that clicks follow impressions
independently of when the content was shared and by which source. Hence the structure
of sharing in the network primarily affect the clicks produced by a Tweet solely through
the number of impressions that this Tweet produces. Note that, once a source decides to
post a link, impressions depend on how various followers of that source actually update
their feed, whether they actively read its feed, perhaps through a list. It does not, however,
depends on the content of the URL itself.
The above observations on how clicks get generated motivates us to propose a simple
two stage model to extrapolate how many clicks are received. Stage 1 (described in §2.2.1)
is graph dependent and describes how shared posts translates to impressions. This stage
incorporates information about which users are sharing the posts and their relative times of
sharing. Stage 2 (described in §2.2.2) is content dependent and establishes the translation of
impressions to clicks. This model allows one to extrapolate clicks as created by impression
without even requiring to measure them. Since Stage 1 depends on the source but not the
content of the link, Stage 2 is the exact opposite: it depends on the content of the link but
not on the source and time that create an impression. This separation allows different part
of the model to be tuned using public information only.
2.2 Dynamically Predicting Clicks
We now describe how to implement a simple two stage model of click generation from
social media using a dynamic estimation of impressions produced. This model is shown to
improve accuracy for two general prediction problems: First, a real time click prediction, in
which one attempts to deduce the amount of clicks produced by social media conversations
from its associated tweets. Second, a day-ahead forecast, where the goal is to estimate the
total clicks gathered at the end of the day from a single observation obtained after one hour.
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Figure 2.7: Relationship of impressions to (left) receptions and (right) predicted impres-
sions. Each line represents a single URL and each point represents the time period. The
red line is the identity line for comparison.
2.2.1 A Memory-less Model of Impressions
Impressions produced by links on social media are rarely publicly known. As seen before,
receptions which are publicly known can function as a proxy, but only when considering
total counts over long periods of time. This is because they exhibit very different dynamics.
(Figure 2.7 (left)), owing to the time lag between when a link is posted (when receptions
are counted) and viewed (when impressions increases). In fact most of the receptions of a
given link occur within the first hour, confirming the trend that while shares usually occur
early in the life-cycle of a tweet, impressions and, therefore, clicks occur later in its life
([Gabielkov et al. 2016]).
We propose a simple memory-less model in which a fraction q of the receptions are
’activated’ in each of the T time periods. Following that, all activated impressions are re-
moved, and the process repeats on the remaining fraction (1 − q) in the next time period,
and so on until none are left. Of all activated receptions in a given time slot (which corre-
sponds for instance, to the potential viewer logging to Twitter), we assume a fraction s will
create an impression.
Let xt be the observed number of receptions in time t ∈ [1, T ] and y˜t be the predicted
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Table 2.1: Mean and median of scaling parameter s and geometric parameter q.
Training mean(s) median(s) mean (q) median (q)
Hour 1 0.08 0.07 0.32 0.32
Hour 1 to Hour 4 0.46 0.06 0.32 0.28
cumulative number of impressions in time t. Then we have
y˜t = s ·
t∑
τ=1
xτ · (1− qt−τ+1).
Loss function For each article, we learn the model parameters s and q by minimizing the
square error between the predicted number of clicks (y˜t∀t ∈ [1, T ]) and the actual number








(yτ − y˜τ )2.
Parameter Optimization We used the L-BFGS-B optimization method [Liu and No-
cedal 1989] from Python’s SciPy toolkit [Jones, Oliphant, Peterson, et al. 2001–] for the
minimization. We learn the parameters individually for each article shared. The means and
medians of the parameter values (split by the training data used) are given by Table 2.1.
We compare these predicted impressions with the actual impressions (Figure 2.7 (right)).
Here, each line represents a single URL shared and so we see the accumulation of impres-
sions with time. We see that the transformation according to the model accomplishes two
things: (1) scaling down the over-estimated receptions and (2) correcting for the time bias
in the reception measurement.
2.2.2 Predicting Clicks from Impressions
The memory-less model in §2.2.1 predicts the degree of exposure or potential audience
of an article. We observe that the ratio of clicks per impression remains stable over time
(Figure 2.6). Thus, we can use a simple multiplicative factor to estimate the clicks from
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Table 2.2: Mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and adjusted MAPE of the prediction
by the memory-less model.
Training MAPE MAPE (adjusted)
Hour 1 17.29 % 16.20 %
Hour 1 to Hour 4 12.68 % 11.97%
Figure 2.8: Distribution of adjusted absolute percentage error (MAPE) for each time period
(right) and truncated to better see the distributions (left).
the predicted impressions at hour t (y˜t). This factor is computed at the first time period as
the clicks-to-impressions ratio at time t = 1 i.e., CPIt=1 =
z′1
y˜1
where z′t is the observed
number of (bit.ly) clicks at time t. Let z˜t be the predicted cumulative number of clicks at
time t. Then
z˜t = CPIt=1 · y˜t.
In order to predict clicks, we combine the two phases – the geometric memory-less
model and the multiplicative prediction. In our evaluation, we use two sets of training data
(1) the first hour of shares and clicks (2) the first four hours of shares and clicks. Table 2.2
indicates the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) excluding those articles with zero
clicks (which have an infinite MAPE). We also compute an adjusted MAPE value with
every prediction and actual value being incremented by 1 to capture the errors for those
articles with zero clicks. The distribution of the absolute percentage errors for each time
period shows that while later time periods have slightly more errors, the increase is not
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Figure 2.9: Predicted (z˜T ) and actual (zT ) total clicks vs (left) bit.ly clicks at hour 1 (z′1)
and (right) predicted impressions at hour 1 (y˜1)
dramatic (Figure 2.8). Further we see that most of the predictions are actually within a
narrow range of the correct value (less than 10%).
2.2.3 Predicting Future Clicks
In the previous method, we used hourly bit.ly clicks and hourly reception counts, both
public forms of data, to estimate hourly clicks and hourly impressions, as validated by our
private data. The method in fact, uses share information from the current time period to
predict the number of clicks the link will receive in the same time period. A more predictive
model would be to predict future click information. We extend our model, using early data
about clicks and our impression predictions to predict future clicks.
We created a linear model for predicting the total number of (private data) clicks on a
URL (z˜T ), from just the observed number of (bit.ly) clicks at time 1 (z′1 ) and our predicted
impressions at time 1 (y˜1). The model is defined as:
log(z˜T ) = β0 + β1 log(z
′
1) + β2 log(y˜1).
Using 10-fold cross validation, we arrived at an MAPE of 12.4% (adjusted for zero
values, MAPE=9.23%) (computed in log-space). This can be seen in Figure 2.9.
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In fact, using the first hour of clicks alone proves predictive of future success (MAPE =
13.3%, adjusted MAPE = 10%). We find modest improvements (not shown) by consid-
ering the fourth hour of clicks. The addition of account-based features (e.g. posting fre-
quency, median total CPR) also provided only trivial improvement, giving us further clue
that they don’t provide much additional impact on the dynamics of the clicks aside from
what hour 1 clicks and impressions already capture.
2.2.4 Comparison with Other Prediction Methods
Our model is one of the few to predict clicks rather than shares or posts, making a direct
comparison challenging. In the following sections, we tackle this in the following ways:
• Adapting share prediction models to predict future clicks: By modifying other meth-
ods to predict clicks, we can directly compare our day-ahead click prediction with
their models.
• Comparison of our method across different BuzzFeed accounts: The different ac-
counts in BuzzFeed have very different behavior from news to lifestyle related posts.
By training on one set to predict others, we can verify that our methods results are not
dependent on a specific type of behavior but rather can generalize to other datasets.
• Comparison to hourly prediction methods: New diffusion prediction models predict
popularity at every time period. We can use these as direct comparisons with our
hourly prediction methods.
Comparison with Adjusted Prediction Methods
One means by which we address this is to adapt previous methods to predict click infor-
mation rather than shares. In Table 2.3 we compare the results from our predictions with
several other commonly used ones. In the model of Szabo et al. ([Szabo and Huberman
2010]), final share counts are predicted using the early information about the shares. In our
adapted comparison, the click counts are predicted using the first hour of click information
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Method Feature(s) MAPE R2
Day-Ahead Prediction clicks in hour 1, 34% 0.903
impressions in hour 1
Szabo et al. [Szabo and Huberman 2010] clicks in hour 1 40% 0.76
Pinto et al. [Pinto, Almeida, and Gonc¸alves 2013] clicks in hour 1, 147% 0.73
hour 2, hour 3, and hour 4
Szabo et al. [Szabo and Huberman 2010] shares in hour 1 78.8% 0.4
with click transform
Pinto et al. [Pinto, Almeida, and Gonc¸alves 2013] shares in hour 1, 81.3% 0.41
with click transform hour 2, hour 3, and hour 4
Table 2.3: Prediction results for several methods.
in log-space. Pinto et al. ([Pinto, Almeida, and Gonc¸alves 2013]) leverage retweet counts
from subsequent hours as additional features of a linear model. We tested this idea, using
hour 1 and hour 4 clicks as the feature set. In both cases, we use 20-fold cross valida-
tion. We see that using our estimated impressions provides a significant boost (even over
additional time periods of click behavior).
Another means by which we test our method is to combine principles from previous
work as well as our current work. While we see that earlier methods might not be the most
effective at predicting clicks, they have been shown to work well in predicting shares. The
underlying reasoning for the usage of shares as a measure of popularity is that they are
highly correlated to clicks. If this is the case, then there should be some constant fraction
of shares that are converted to clicks. We computed this constant fraction from the publicly
observed clicks and retweets at the end of the first hour of a clicks lifetime. Table 2.3
shows the results of this transformation. The results of this is dependent on the amount of
information used to compute the clicks to shares ratio. For instance, using an entire day of
data to compute the ratio results in much improved predictions.
We can also compare our click prediction against the click values derived from bit.ly.
These bit.ly derived click values are publicly available but sometimes does not accurately
reflect the actual observed clicks. Our model has smaller residuals than untouched bit.ly
clicks do, across all time periods (Figure 2.10).
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Figure 2.10: Distribution of adjusted absolute percentage error (MAPE) for our method
(solid) compared to bit.ly (dotted) for each time period (right) and truncated to better see
the distributions (left).
Compared to many other models, our model only relies on the first hour of data. In
particular, it only relies on easy to obtain public information. As such, it provides greater
utility in forecasting applications with time constraints.
Cross-Account Prediction
Both sharing and clicking behavior is different across different domains. This is quite
visible in Figure 2.4 where each of the clusters correspond to different BuzzFeed accounts.
In order to validate the generality of our approach, we compare our predictions on the
various accounts. This also accounts for effects of content type e.g., news vs quizzes. We
hold out all the links and information for a particular Twitter account and train on the
remaining accounts.
We do this for the 5 accounts with the most tweets in this particular dataset: the main
BuzzFeed account, a quiz-based account, and three international edition accounts. We see
results very similar to that of the mixed account datasets, in Figure 2.11. Our model’s
MAPE was, on average, around 30% (average R2 = 0.25) across the accounts tested. Fur-
ther, we compared this approach using other prediction models. The model of of Szabo et
al. had an average MAPE of 50% (average R2 = -0.58). The Pinto et al. model yielded a
MAPE average of 340% (average R2 = -2.14).
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Figure 2.11: Predicting (day-ahead) clicks on held-out accounts. We compare the model’s
cross-account predictive performance to Szabo’s and Pinto’s, using Median Absolute Per-
cent Error (Left) and R2 (Right).
Comparison with Hourly Prediction Models
Recently, research has been focused on popularity prediction methods which rely on mod-
eling the underlying diffusion [Shen et al. 2014; Zhao et al. 2015; Rizoiu et al. 2017]. These
primarily rely on timing information about the diffusion. Further, several of these model
exogenous and endogenous diffusion separately to better account for different processes
that result from each.
At a high level, methods to forecast clicks typically assume some initial impact of a
share, which then has a decaying impact over time. One paper on which we focus our
comparison (HIP) uses a Hawkes Internsity Process to model the decay and accumulate
impact from multiple shares [Rizoiu et al. 2017]. In this model, the forecasted number of
views is the sum of the influence of current shares and the sum of influences of deprecated
previous shares. They use a number of parameters to capture features like the type of
content, network of diusion, and sensitivity to promotion. The feature sets used are the
number of shares of the link/video at each point in time. HIP predicts view counts of a
YouTube video, a metric that corresponds to clicks for a URL link.
There are several differences between our geometric model and the HIP model. Our
model is simpler, with only two parameters used (s and q) compared to the 5-6 used by
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Table 2.4: Mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and adjusted MAPE of the prediction
by HIP and by our memory-less model.
Method Training MAPE MAPE (adjusted)
Geometric model Hour 1 17.29 % 16.20 %
HIP Hour 1 102.2 % 99.5 %
Geometric model Hour 1 to Hour 4 12.68 % 11.97%
HIP Hour 1 to Hour 4 91.7 % 89.7 %
HIP. Our model also uses the additional information that comes from impressions. This
is valuable because it not only captures how much a link is shared but also the potential
influence of each share. Ours is memoryless and we only need to keep track of how many
individuals are in the potential audience, not when they joined the audience pool. How-
ever, the main difference is the model itself. Our model uses a polynomial depreciation of
influence which results in the influence of a share having a longer effect compared to the
exponential depreciation used in HIP.
We implemented their model, modifying it to account for the varying granularity in our
dataset. We used two feature sets in the comparison - the first hour and the first four hours
of the lifespan of the post. Specifically, for the first hour of a post, we used the number of
shares in that first hour. For our method, we also include the number of impressions in the
first hour. Similarly, when using the first four hours, the feature sets were the the number of
shares (and impressions) for hour 1, hour 2, hour 3 and hour4 of the lifespan of the tweet.
We trained the models on the predicted number of clicks after the first hour (or the fourth
hour). Note that this method has fewer data points because the (non-linear) optimization
failed to converge.
In Table 2.4, we see that our method significantly outperforms HIP. One possibility for
why this might be the case is that our method uses the the additional information of the
receptions. To test this idea, we used their model with an input of the number of receptions
(instead of shares). If this is the key difference, then, one would expect their model to
match or outperform ours. We find that the MAPE is 102.2% for 1 hour of training data
and 24.0% for 4 hours of training data (adjusted MAPE is 106.3% and 32.2% respectively).
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Figure 2.12: Scatter plot of the actual (x-axis) vs predicted (y-axis) values from the HIP
model for training data of (top) 1 hour of data and (bottom) 4 hours of data. Each column
shows the results of prediction at a particular time period.
Figure 2.13: Scatter plot of the actual (x-axis) vs predicted (y-axis) values from our
memory-less model for training data of (top) 1 hour of data and (bottom) 4 hours of data.
Each column shows the results of prediction at a particular time period..
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From the modeling perspective, there are differences as well. While fundamentally
both assume a decaying impact of a share, they do so in different ways. Our memory-less
exponential decrease is more short-lived while the polynomial decay in HIP assumes a
longer-term impact. HIP habitually underestimates the number of clicks, even with 4 hours
of data (Figure 2.12.) By comparison, our method closely aligns with the actual values
(Figure 2.13).
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we documented techniques to use multiple public data sources to predict
private information. We validated the use of click-rate metrics derived from public infor-
mation. We found that the time, account, and content affect the dynamics of a link but they
all act independently of each other. In our analyses, we show that the relationship between
shares and clicks is not straightforward. Rather, it is a two-stage process with a key inter-
mediate piece of information, impressions. We developed a model based on this two-stage
process to predict the temporal dynamics of a post using publicly available data. Our model
reliably predicts the performance of a link based on very early information. Overall, we
hope that our model and methodology will help foster better understanding of sharing and
audience dynamics.
Since this method relies on data that is public (the shared posts as well as the number of
followers of the poster), it would not apply in private settings such as Facebook. Such cases
are yet another avenue of research, where the prediction model could relies on observed
clicks/visitors to estimate the future popularity.
In Chapter 1 and 2, we see that the use of multiple sources of data can extend the power
to learn about both the users of a network and the information shared in the network. With
very minimal information about the shared information, we can infer its longer term per-
formance. In the following chapters, we transition from studying the result of information
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production to its initial generation. We look at how this information is generated and how
network structure might have an impact into its diffusion.
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Chapter 3
Specialization in Static Networks
In social network services, such as Twitter and Facebook, the primary commodity pro-
duced and exchanged is content and information. While, arguably, much of this process is
solely driven by personal gain, these social conversations play an increasingly larger role
in today’s economy. This is unsurprising since decades of empirical studies, predating any
online conversation, have shown how individuals rely on their peers or contacts to acquire
information before making a choice.
Our goal is to understand how individual choices govern how original information is
produced and acquired in today’s social networks. We focus on the domain of identification
of news content worth reading, where social connections are massively used. Social net-
works benefit users by making the result of this effort available to more people. Previous
studies highlight that only a minority of participants add information to those networks, as
opposed to simply listening or passing it on (via, e.g., retweets, likes). Many important
open questions remain: In a given network, which users have an incentive to produce more
original content? Previous studies have shown that influencers are not easy to differentiate
from ordinary users. Can we predict the outcome of such a mechanism, where some users
specialize? Are there types of content or networks that favor the formation of an elite?
In this section, we show the following contributions:
56
1. We analyze data from multiple online sources exchanged through Twitter, high-
lighting the production of original content remains extremely concentrated. Barring
institutional accounts, the majority of the original content comes from users with
mid-range popularity rather than just the just well known people. In fact, counter-
intuitively, original content production is skewed towards less active and connected
people. (Section 3.1).
2. Since the availability of news worth reading in a social network exhibits the property
of a public good, we propose a simple model that extend public good theory to ac-
commodate investment made by individual players towards a perishable good. This
model allows us to answer how specialization occurs in knowledge sharing, even
where players are ex ante identical in structure and behavior i.e., players are identical
before they begin interacting with others and even after interacting, continue to be-
have in the same way as others. We first prove that a unique Nash Equilibrium exists
for sufficiently short-lived content, under a condition related to spectral properties
of the social network. However, we prove that when content is long-lived, special-
ization is unavoidable, even with identical players on a symmetric graph. Given the
presence of multiple equilibria and sensitivity to initial conditions, predictions are
complex. (Section 3.2).
3.0.1 Related Work
To model the content production choices of individuals, we draw upon literature regarding
the analysis of the private provision of public goods, or investments made by players that
more generally affect the outcome of others, which originally emerged to inform public
policy. Its most celebrated result, the neutrality principle [Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian
1986], states that the investment produced by a group is entirely carried by most wealthy
individuals, and is insensitive to income redistribution. This, however, holds only for a
global public good in which all players are equally affected by others, and recently was
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shown not to generalize beyond regular graphs [Allouch 2015]. The general network case
was studied more recently [Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou 2006; Bramoulle´ and
Kranton 2006; Bramoulle´ et al. 2014].Even for that simple case, predictions vastly differ:
On the one hand, a study of small effects [Bramoulle´ et al. 2014] proves that the system
converges to a unique equilibrium in which all participate.
On the other hand, more general cases prove that specialization is unavoidable, and that
multiple equilibria can be attained [Bramoulle´ and Kranton 2006]. Our analysis extends
those results by providing the first non-linear dynamics for which a similar dichotomy can
be proved; in particular, it proves that a simple model of perishable public goods leads
to either of these behaviors depending on the product lifespan. The main novelty of our
approach is to model information as a public good with decaying value over time i.e., they
are perishable goods. As a public good, the utility of information to a user comes from her
own contributions as well as those of her neighbors. This new approach allows theory and
practice to qualitatively align, in spite of simplistic modeling of user behavior.
Our work also relates to studies of online diffusion of information which have previ-
ously established the importance of content produced by mass media in online diffusion.
They highlight in particular that news typically reaches a large audience not directly but
through a set of influencers or connectors [Cha et al. 2012; Wu et al. 2011]. This result con-
firms the classical hypothesis of a two-step information flow [Katz 1957], and was shown
to have additional benefits, such as broadening the range of opinions seen by a user [An
et al. 2011]. However, the dynamics of participation and influence remains elusive. For
instance, relying on number of followers to judge an influencer can be misleading [Cha
et al. 2010; Bakshy et al. 2011] and predicting who is successful at an individual level was
shown to be generally unreliable [Bakshy et al. 2011].
Our work takes a different starting point: We follow evidence that a large fraction of
diffusion cascades occur close to a seed node [Goel, Watts, and Goldstein 2012]. Hence
we focus on identifying those who contribute in adding original content in the network,
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and how this relates to temporal characteristics of the content being exchanged. Previous
studies of temporal properties of diffusion typically focused on leveraging that those are
short-lived [Cha et al. 2009; Rodriguez, Balduzzi, and Scho¨lkopf 2011], or on using pat-
terns in the time series for better classification [Kwon and Cha 2014; Kamath et al. 2013;
Yang and Leskovec 2011].
These elites in information acquisition have been studied in very different contexts
such as social learning [Bala and Goyal 1998; Acemoglu et al. 2011] and opinion forma-
tion [Golub and Jackson 2010; Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and ParandehGheibi 2010], and even
user generated content [Easley and Ghosh 2013; Ghosh and McAfee 2011]. Those results
are different in spirit from ours as they typically focus on aggregation of multiple contri-
butions on the same specific topic, either within a social networks or in the presence of
a kernel of experts. For that reason, they typically assume specific types of information
or interactions. Our model focuses on a simpler model in which information can be pro-
duced under some exerted effort, but is free to reproduce within a given network. The work
motivated similarly to ours considers a similar process in an endogenous network where
players may create new links at a fixed cost [Galeotti and Goyal 2010]. It was shown that
these dynamics typically lead to extreme specialization, even among ex ante identical play-
ers. However, heterogeneous systems can’t be analyzed in the same manner, and networks
produced are typically very schematic (bi-partite). Our work proves that specialization
emerges in an exogenous network, even without the reinforcing process of strategic link
formation.
3.1 The existence of specialization
Unsurprisingly, in social media like Twitter, a small fraction of users are responsible for a
large part of the activity. Many behaviors comprise online activity (e.g., sharing something
new, retweeting a link, commenting). We concentrate on understanding how knowledge
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Figure 3.1: Lorenz curve (i.e., cumulative share of the top x% nodes in the audience seen as
a function of x) comparing (right) production of tweets and original content for cnn.com
from KAIST-NEWS and (left) “first local tweets in two different domains.
sharing occurs. With that end in mind, we focus our studies on posts that share a link to
some news article (the source of knowledge).
Imbalanced content creation
We quantify this concentration of activity by using the Lorenz curve [Lorenz 1905]. With
the KAIST-NEWS dataset, we plot the cumulative share of the top x % of users as a func-
tion of x in Figure 3.1(right). Since some domains only cater to niche groups, the fraction
x here is measured relative to the domain’s audience size (i.e., anyone who received or sent
at least one such URL).
A quick glance at the plot confirms that the size of passive and active audience differ
by orders of magnitude (e.g., as seen here and in other domains, 99% do not tweet a single
URL. Equivalently, 1% of the audience produces almost all the new tweets in the network).
In addition to examining how users post in general (red solid line), we also look at how
they acquire original information for the network. We, hence, looked at users who were the
first on twitter to post a URL link (“global first” represented by the short green dotted line)
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and users who were the first in their local network, i.e. they did not receive the URL from
anyone they followed before they sent the URL (“local first” represented by the long blue
dashed line). Note that in each of these cases, the overall audience remains the same - those
who have received the link either directly or indirectly from an originator. Here, in the left
figure, 0.1% of the cnn.com audience produces half of all tweets. But the same number of
people produce 60% of the globally original content and almost 90% of the locally original
content. Perhaps unsurprisingly, while only a small minority of nodes re-post articles, it is
an even smaller minority that introduces original content in the network.
Specialization is the phenomenon of users taking extreme positions - in our case, some
users expend a lot of effort while others are on the other extreme of expending almost
no effort. To help quantify this phenomenon, we introduce the 90%-volume originators
measure defined as the fraction of the audience that together produce 90% of the volume.
Characterizing content originators
It has been shown (see, e.g., [May et al. 2014]) that a user’s tweeting activity is strongly
correlated with their in- and out-degree. Intuitively, an active online presence is required
to gather many followers. Having many followers encourages a return connection by other
users. One hypothesis of a simple hierarchy of social media emerges: the content producers
responsible for new content creation, the power users and intermediaries who drive the
traffic and the passive consumers. As we see here, reality is at odds with this expectation
when it comes to production of original content.
Figure 3.2 (left) presents, for users binned according to their activity on the x-axis,
the distribution of the fraction of local first content they produce with median and various
percentiles. To help interpretation, we represent qualitatively with a thin solid line the
number of users in each bin, where the first bin contains approximately 129k users. On the
right we observe the effects of a few heavy nodes: there are in total 90 users posting more
than 400 URLs in a month, who are primarily either institutional accounts or professional
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Figure 3.2: Fraction of locally original activity, presented as percentiles among users pop-
ulation binned according to (top) activity and (bottom) number of accounts they follow.
journalists and are almost always original. However, those are exceptions: among the
active users, originators are generally a minority typically the 25% most original chosen
across all activity levels. On the contrary, this trend proves that a URL is most likely to
be locally original when it is posted by less active users. Equivalently, if the authors of
that tweet post approximately 50 URLs in a month, it is likely to be one she has previously
received. Another concurring observation, shown in Figure 3.2 (right), presents the same
distribution where users are binned on the x-axis according to the number of people they
follow. The trend here is even more pronounced as users belonging to the less connected
half are much more likely to produce original information.
While, at first, this trend appears relatively surprising, the theory of public goods offers
a simple explanation that we leverage later: that the effort exerted by others creates a
disincentive for a well connected player to acquire new information. It seems in particular
that 50% of users with larger than average degree rely entirely on the information they
receive for their posts.
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Effect of Time
Finally, we study the factors quantitatively affecting specialization. To take an example,
first, we show in Figure 3.1(left) a comparison between the Lorenz curves for two news
media domains: New York Times and The Atlantic. These are different in multiple ways:
The New York Times is a daily newspaper with a very large readership while the Atlantic
is a monthly magazine with a smaller readership. When comparing Lorenz curves, the At-
lantic is more specialized than the New York Times with 0.4% of the audience accounting
for 75% of theatlantic.com tweets while 0.8% of the audience accounts for 75%
of nytimes.com tweets. This indicates that audiences of different sources specialize in
different ways.
One metric for characterizing the difference is a notion of how long an article is ex-
pected to be relevant. We define the shelf life of an article to be the amount of time for
which it is relevant i.e., it continues to be shared among users. For every media, we mea-
sure its average shelf life by using the number of unique URLs produced over a month. This
captures the fact that, since all media compete for attention within the same online network,











bbc.co.uk 19600 3252997 6248 113693 2.20
businessweek.com 777 622615 927 9405 55.60
cnn.com 10255 3026569 4458 94965 4.21
csmonitor.com 337 460161 492 3561 128.19
economist.com 232 802242 922 3714 186.21
forbes.com 1934 921576 1198 12375 22.34
foxnews.com 1529 510935 2845 19383 28.25
ft.com 6750 1373373 2647 28497 6.4
guardian.co.uk 5612 2106241 2294 45911 7.70
huffingtonpost.com 3742 1443562 2492 36974 11.54
mirror.co.uk 1306 638255 708 4863 33.08
news.yahoo.com 7684 1467238 5227 65734 5.62
newsweek.com 517 783171 679 3465 83.56
newyorker.com 299 754866 656 2444 144.48
npr.org 447 1220573 1066 12100 96.64
nytimes.com 5917 2677563 4085 111674 7.30
online.wsj.com 5077 1394111 2075 37581 8.51
reuters.com 16634 1435299 2621 61955 2.60
salon.com 803 1082391 745 4501 53.80
slate.com 518 676407 897 3097 83.40
theatlantic.com 5917 489222 804 4670 7.30
theonion.com 795 1427288 1238 11969 54.34
time.com 2293 530981 4370 14299 18.84
usatoday.com 3281 1141070 1570 20912 13.17
usnews.com 1089 580657 373 4222 39.67
vanityfair.com 162 598879 743 2261 266.67
washingtonpost.com 2886 1755915 2051 35554 14.97
wired.com 1751 1325465 2307 17640 24.67
Table 3.1: Expiration times of different news sources
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Figure 3.3: Concentration of sharing compared to the shelf-life for each media source.
Each point is the fraction of the audience responsible for 90% of the tweet volume of the
media source.
Our main observation is as follows: the degree of specialization is related to the tem-
poral dynamics of the content, with remarkable regularity. For every media, we measure
its average shelf life by using the number of unique URLs produced over a month. We
define the shelf life of an article to be the amount of time for which it is relevant i.e., it
continues to be shared among users. Figure 3.3 shows the 90%-volume originator (i.e., the
percentage of the audience producing 90% of tweet volumes) for 31 media sources. There
is a fairly large range of shelf life from approximately 2 minutes to over 2 hours. However,
we consistently observe that domains with long shelf times tend involve a smaller fraction
of the population to produce most of the content.
Note that these results hold for various definitions of content creation from introducing
new content to the network to participating in the conversation around a shared article. In a
medium like twitter, this conversation (the original tweet as well as all associated retweets
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Figure 3.4: Concentration of shar-
ing compared to the diffusion-life
for each article. Each article’s dif-
fusion life is the total active time
(in minutes) of the article.
and links) behave as the conversation compared to mediums like blogs where the comments
serve the same purpose.
We also examined the effect of different measures of shelf lives in Figure 3.4. We
calculate the diffusion life as the length of time that the article is shared (time of last post
- time of first post). The y-axis is a measure of concentration, fraction of locally first
posts of the total number of people receiving the article. We normalized by the number of
users posting the article, in order to better account for larger cascades. Other measures of
concentration, such as the fraction of first local posts by the total number of posts of an
article, also exhibit similar trends, albeit in a more muted fashion. We continue to see the
trend of articles with longer shelf lives tend to be more concentrated in sharing.
We have made several observations: (1) The presence of specialization where a small
number of individuals are responsible for most of the original content produced on Twitter.
(2) These individuals who produce most of the original content are not, as expected at first
glance, the most well connected or the highest degree nodes. Rather, they are average-
degree nodes in the network. (3) There is a correlation between the shelf life of an article,
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the time for which it is relevant, and the degree of specialization. In the following sec-
tion, we present an idealized model which retains the flavor of the problem of information
search.
3.2 Why does specialization occur?
While information diffusion on social media is complex and topic dependent, our goal in
this section is to provide a simple model with which previous observations of information
acquisition can be predicted. We leverage the economic theory of public goods – goods
that are non-rivalrous where use by one individual does not reduce availability to others.
In fact, in many public goods models, the ownership of the good by on individual has an
impact on the utility of his neighbors. Further, we consider news as a perishable good, i.e.
a good that needs to be used within a short period of time and bought again (such as milk
or produce). While news does not spoil in the same sense as produce does, the value of
news does decrease with time due to updated information and later events occurring. In
both cases, since the product is short-lived and the demand is persistent, there is a time
dynamic to renew it.
A Public Good Approach to Original Content Production
A individual, i, derives value from the content produced. Whether this is through her own
efforts or her neighbors’ efforts does not change the underlying value. In the general case,
we assume this content has some value some convex function f(yi) where yi represents the
effort made by i. The user also has some convex cost, c(yi), associated with searching and
finding the information.
There is a social component to the interaction: users make the results of their work
available to neighbors in a social network graph. We denote the adjacency matrix of the
social network as G = (V,E) and it can either be undirected (e.g., Facebook) or directed
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(e.g., Twitter). The neighbors of i is denoted by N(i). Without loss of generality, we
assume that the effort of a user only affects its direct neighbors. The general case simply
requires redefining neighboring relations to include future descendants.
The value to the user is thus a function of the available results of all the efforts (yi+y−i
where y−i =
∑
j∈N(i) yj). The total utility of a user is then defined as
U(yi, y−i) = f(yi + y−i) + c(yi).
The above general utility is true of any networked public good. In the setting of infor-
mation aqcuisition, the utility of information is represented as being in an informed state.
In this state, a user has an additional unit of return compared to being uninformed. Upon a
discovery, a user remains in the informed state for a time τ equal to the shelf time of this
item. We assume τ is a constant.
As content online is vast and not easy to navigate, we assume that player i seeks knowl-
edge at a given rate. This results in content being discovered by her at random times with
an intensity yi, forming a Poisson process of discovery times. The effort of that user to
individually achieve a discovery rate yi has a convex cost c(yi). This captures the fact that
as more effort is exerted, or time is invested, worthwhile information becomes rare and
harder to find.
Let us denote y−i =
∑
j∈N(i) yj as the rate of content discovery that a user i in the
network receives at no cost from her neighbors. Then, including her own effort cost c(yi),
the average utility received per unit of time can be written as:
U(yi, y−i) = 1− e−τ(yi+y−i) − c(yi) .
At time t = T , the probability to have received one content item within ]T − τ ;T ] is the
probability that a Poisson process of rate (yi + y−i) creates no point in that interval.
Note here, that discovering multiple content simultaneously creates no additional ben-
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efit to the user since the user is already in the informed state. Note also that having content
items of various shelf-lives would result in the same dynamics as long as those durations
are chosen independently of the discovery process. Finally, while most of the properties of
the model we show generalizes to general convex cost, we are primarily interested in poly-
nomial cost (c : yi 7→ θα+1yα+1i ), α > 0. We can think of θ as the reference time period. A
reward of 1 is equivalent to the effort spent to produce content once every θ time. In this
work, we assume, in general, that the cost is normalized such that θ = 1hr. This means that
the reward exactly compensates for the search effort incurred to produce original content
every hour. More general models, especially ones with heterogeneous costs and a matrix
of benefits transfer between users, are likely to perfect realism of this model, but we leave
them for future work.
Best Response We first analyze a single individual response of a player to her neighbors’
efforts. Even with non-linear dynamics is non-linear, we can represent this best response
action in a simple closed form.
Theorem 1. For a node, i, of G = (V,E), the best response to i’s neighbors’ efforts, y−i,
is given by







α ), where W is the Lambert function defined on [0;∞[ as the
inverse of the function x 7→ x exp(x).
Proof. For an individual, i, their best response to their neighbors efforts occurs when i’s
utility is maximized w.r.t. the amount of effort i invests, yi.
max
yi
U(yi, y−i) s.t. yi ≥ 0 , i.e., , ∂U(yi, y−i)
∂yi
= 0 .
This yields τe−τ(yi+y−i) − yαi = 0.



































Figure 3.5: Comparison of the Lambert function (W (z) where z = W (z)eW (z)) to the
common function of x, log (x), and
√
x in the range (left) [0,4] and (right) [1,100].
The Lambert function W is a positive increasing function, that is asymptotically equiv-
alent to the identity near 0 and comes within a negligible distance of the function x 7→
ln(x) − ln ln(x) as x becomes large. The last two decades has found numerous applica-
tions of this function to differential equation, combinatorics, theoretical physics and others.
Its computation, both through formal calculus and numerical approximation can be done
fast.






Nash Equilibrium We initially focus on analyzing the Nash equilibrium in symmetric
graphs.
Definition 1. A graph G is symmetric if, given any two pairs of edges (u1, v1) and (u2, v2)
of G, there is an automorphism f : V (G)→ V (G) such that f(u1) = u2 and f(v1) = v2.
In a symmetric graph, in a unique Nash Equilibrium, all nodes exert the same amount
of effort. Observe that if this were not the case, a transformation of the graph results in
another equilibrium.












Proof. In a symmetric equilibrium, yi = y,∀i ∈ G. Also, for a node i, y−i = Dy.










































The case of symmetric graphs is interesting because, as we show in Section 3.2.1, this
symmetric equilibrium need not always be a unique or stable equilibrium.
3.2.1 Model Validation
Real world graphs are, of course, more complex than the above symmetric graph models.
We validate our model on a subset of the NYT graph (a random sample of 10% of the
edges). We use an iterative update method (Algorithm 2) to find the Nash equilibrium
numerically. In these simulations, we used a range of shelf-life times ranging from short
(τ = 1) to long (τ = 1000).
Matching our observations from the KAIST-NEWS dataset, users with larger degree
have less “information seeking activity”. This is reflected in a smaller amount of effort
spent in the Nash Equilibrium. Figure 3.6 (left) shows the correlation of the Nash Equilib-
rium effort with out-degree of a node (τ = 0.5 on a sample of 0.1% of the NYT graph).
Here, we see a very strong relationship between the degree and the amount of effort ex-
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ALGORITHM 2: Finding the Nash equilibrium for our system by iterative update,
in the instance when a simple closed form does not exist.
Input: Graph G = (V,E), Expiration-time τ , initialization value (optional)
Output: The amount of effort y∗ = y∗1, ..y∗I , ..y∗N
y = 0; repeat
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Figure 3.6: The Nash Equilibrium (as a function of (left) node degree and (right) fraction
of first local activity) in a sample of the NYT graph
pended in the Nash Equilibrium. Thus, our model yields predictive power for relation of
connection and investment in information search
We then observe that the elite in the modeled equilibrium share similar structure to
those observed empirically (Figure 3.7). A small subset of individuals are responsible for
a large fraction of the effort spent – mimicking the behavior of individuals with original
content.
Lastly, we examine how the effort in the Nash equilibrium of our model correlates
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Figure 3.7: Proportion of population responsible for 50%, 75% and 90% of the effort in
the Nash Equilibrium in sample of NYT graph.
(Figure 3.6 right). Ideally, we would expect to see perfect correlation since the effort in our
model captures exactly this, the effort you spent to bring new content to your neighbors.
We see that individuals who in the real world had no effort (the left most group) expend
low effort in the Nash Equilibrium. Those who posted at least one article expended more
effort and the amount of effort steadily rises.
Conditions for a Unique Nash Equilibrium Different classes of goods exhibit different
types of behavior. In economic theory, one of these classifications are that of a normal
good is a good for which demand increases with increased wealth. Mathematically, if
γ : R≥0 → R≥0 is a differentiable function representing the income elasticity of demand
(the responsiveness of the demand to a change in the income), then the good is normal
iff the derivative satisfies 0 < γ′ < 1. A network normal good carries that idea to a
networked case where there is a income elasticity of demand function for each player i in
the network. The consumption γi is defined in terms of the wealth of i (set externally),
wi, and i’s “social income”, the income from neighbors of i, y−i. A network normal good
satisfies the condition: 1 + 1
λmin
< γ′i(wi + y−i) < 1 [Allouch 2015]. We can also express
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these conditions in terms of the best response φ(y−i) = γi(wi + y−i)− wi as follows.




In our model, there can exist multiple equilibria for the effort that individuals expend.
Using network normality conditions, we now give a condition involving the expiration time
parameter, τ under which the Nash equilibrium for the system will be unique.
Lemma 3. ∂φ
∂y
















· τ 2 · (−τ) · e−τy ·W ′(τ 2e−τy)
= −τ 2e−τy · W (τ
2e−τy)
τ 2e−τy(1 +W (τ 2e−τy))
= − W (τ
2e−τy)
1 +W (τ 2e−τy)
Theorem 4 (Short-Lived Content Exhibits Less Specialization). Let λmin be the minimum
eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of the network, G = (V,E), and let τ be the expiration
time parameter of the system. Then, a unique Nash Equilibrium exists if







Proof. We will prove the theorem by using the previously established connection between
network normality of the system and the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium [Allouch
2015; Bramoulle´ and Kranton 2006; Bramoulle´ et al. 2014; Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian
1986]. Hence we only need to show that the network normal conditions hold under the
assumptions of the theorem.
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We will show that the condition holds for every player, i. For ease of notation, let
φ = φi and x = y−i.
Observe that sinceW is an increasing function, we have φ′(x) is a non-decreasing func-






























Thus, the network normality conditions holds and a unique Nash equilibrium exists for any
τ < τˆ .
Here, we show the conditions necessary for a unique Nash Equilibrium to exist for
various graph families. Let λmin be the minimum eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of the
network, G = (V,E), and let τ be the expiration time parameter of the system. Then, a
unique Nash Equilibrium exists if







Lemma 5. A complete graph always has a unique Nash equilibrium
Proof. In a complete graph, λmin = −1. Thus, for any value of τ , there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium.










Proof. In a star graph of size n, λmin = −
√
n ([Brouwer and Haemers 2012]). ∴ W (τ 2) <
1√
n−1 =⇒ τ 2 < 1√n−1e
1√
n−1
Lemma 7. An even cycle graph of size n has a unique Nash equilibrium for τ < τˆ =
√
e.











λ = 2 cos
2pij
n
([Brouwer and Haemers 2012]) (j = 0, 1, ..., n− 1)
λmin = 2 · cos (pi − pi
n




λmin = −2 · cos pi
n
(∵ cos(pi − θ) = − cos(θ))
















λmin ≈ −2 + pi
2
n2
Substituting the value for λmin,















Lemma 9. An Erdo¨s-Renyi graph with constant p has a unique Nash equilibrium for τ <






















Substituting the value for λmin,














Lemma 10. A complete bipartite graph of size n has a unique Nash equilibrium for τ <






Proof. The minimum eigenvalue for a complete bipartite graph is given by λmin = −n2 .
Thus W (τ 2) < 2





The quantity τˆ of G specifies the condition under which a unique Nash equilibrium
exists. Table 3.2 details the value of τˆ for various regular graphs ([Ramachandran and
Chaintreau 2015b]).
Our observations on simple regular graphs give us an understanding of the behavior of
the Nash Equilibrium in different types of settings. We see that for shorter lived informa-
tion (content with smaller τ ), the process of sharing is relatively straightforward. In most
graphs, for small τ < τˆ , there exists a unique equilibrium. In symmetric graphs, this equi-
librium is symmetric. In non-regular graphs, the equilibrium response is inversely related
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Table 3.2: Conditions for unique Nash Equilibrium (τ < τˆ ) for graphs with n nodes (α =
1)
Graph λmin τˆ
Complete −1 ∀τ (∞)
Cycle (Even) −2 √e

































to the degree of a node since higher degree nodes can rely on good quality content through
their many neighbors. Conversely, lower degree nodes tend to expend more effort since
they have few neighbors that they can free ride on.
In general, more balanced graphs (with larger λmin) have less sensitivity to the ephemeral
nature of information i.e., the conditions for a unique equilibrium encompass a larger range
of shelf life values. In more segregated graphs (with smaller λmin), the efforts of a few peo-
ple can be enough for the graph as a whole and the equilibrium is less balanced in nature.
Understanding the dependencies of the equilibrium in real world graphs is a little more
challenging. Since these are not d-regular graphs, we do not expect symmetric equilibria to
occur. In the case of the real world NYTimes graph, λmin ≈ −70 (computed with python’s
sparse matrix package). Considering that the size of the NYTimes graph is n = 346k
users, this case more closely resembles a balanced graph, like an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph. For
α = 1, a case where there is a relatively low cost of finding information, τˆ ≈ 0.12 of the
reference time period. For θ = 1hr (i.e., ., assuming readers’ utility for content roughly
compensate an effort to search every hour for new information), τˆ ≈ 7min which is close
to the empirically estimated shelf life of τ = 7.30 min.
Tuning Shelf Life to Maximize Original Information A media source would want to
encourage users to spend more time on their site. Thus, they might be interested in tuning
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their parameter to maximize user effort. In a disconnected setting, each person is responsi-
ble for finding and consuming their own content. In this case, y−i = 0 and the best response






). At the value τ = τ ∗, an individual is incentivitized to
expend maximal effort.
Claim 11. For an isolated node, i, the effort is maximized at τ ∗ = e
1
α+1 .
Proof. The τ that corresponds to the maximum effort satisfies ∂φ
∂τ
= 0. Further, since i is












































It is easy to verify that this critical point is a maxima.
In the case of symmetric graphs, there is always a symmetric equilibrium (Lemma 2).
We can calculate, for symmetric graphs, the τ ∗ that maximizes the amount of effort by any
node in a symmetric equilibrium.
Claim 12. For an symmetric graph of degree D, the effort in a symmetric equilibrium, yi,









(1 + D)) since i has degree D and the equilibrium
is symmetric. Again, the τ that corresponds to the maximum effort satisfies ∂φ
∂τ
= 0. By











Specialization and Symmetry We use simulations to examine how these theoretical re-
sults translate to various graph families. For each graph family, we look at graphs of sizes
ranging from n = 4 to n = 400 and edge density from p = 0.0001 to p = 0.5 (for
Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs). We then run an iterative algorithm that updates the best response un-
til convergence [Ramachandran and Chaintreau 2015b] . The point of convergence (when
it converges) is the Nash equilibrium. In the cases that we examined, the best responses
converged to an equilibrium within 20 steps (though our algorithm does not guarantee con-
vergence).
Considering, first, the case of symmetric graphs (figure 3.8), each line in the graph is
the effort made by a particular node. Note that since many nodes have the same effort
across different regimes of τ , those lines overlapping each other and are hence not visible.
In both the bipartite and cycle graph, in the specialized equilibrium, half the nodes overlap
and expend most of the effort and the remaining half free-ride on those nodes. We see that,
with shorter shelf-lives, individuals are more self-reliant. Conversely, longer shelf lives
result in individuals relying on others efforts. Both cycle graphs and complete bipartite
graphs exhibit the property that when content is long-term, the equilibria becomes more
specialized with some individuals doing the majority of the work and others doing almost
no work. Bipartite graphs split into their two partitions where those in one partition do all
the work while those in the other do none.
The story is more complex in the case on asymmetric graphs (figure 3.9). In each of the
cases, we see a specialized equilibrium emerge. We consider the case of a star graph and
an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph, which gives us simple cases without the effect of heterogeneity. We
also looked at a 10% subset of a real world graph. In the case of the star graph, the single
central node does almost no work while all of his neighbors overlap and have much higher
effort.
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Figure 3.8: Differing effort levels in the Nash Equilibrium (y-axis) with different τ (x-
axis) in symmetric graphs. Each node (of n = 20 nodes) is represented by a line in the
figure. The unique equilibrium (τ < τˆ ) is always symmetric. (left) Complete bipartite
graph (right) Cycle graph.
We see that specialization can occur as a result of the degree distribution (as in asym-
metric graphs). However, this also occurs in symmetric graphs, when all nodes have the
same degree. From lemma 2, we know that a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists, but we
observe that the system converges to a specialized Nash equilibrium. In the following
section, we show that symmetric equilibria are not stable for large τ .
3.2.2 Theoretical Proof of Specialization
When a unique Nash equilibrium exists, we understand the convergent network configura-
tion. However, when there are multiple equilibria, it is not clear which of these configura-
tions are realized — for instance, some of these Nash equilibria can be unstable and, hence,
never realized in practice. Here, we use the same definition of stability as in [Bramoulle´
and Kranton 2006; Bramoulle´ et al. 2014]. A Nash equilibrium is stable if a small change
in the strategy of one player leads to a situation where two conditions hold: (i) the player
who did not change has no better strategy in the new circumstance (ii) the player who did
change is now playing with a strictly worse strategy.












NYTimes graph (10%, 243588 nodes)
Figure 3.9: Differing effort levels with different τ in asymmetric graphs. Each bar rep-
resents the distribution of the amount of effort by all the nodes. The pink line is the
average effort of all the nodes. (top-left) Star graph. (bottom-left) Erdo¨s-Renyi graph
(n = 1000, p = 0.01). (right) Randomly sampled NYTimes graph with 243k nodes.
and a bipartite graph are specialized (figure 3.8), in spite of them being symmetric graphs.
This indicates that the stability of the Nash equilibrium has some dependency on τ .
Theorem 13 (Specialization for Longer Shelf-Life). There exists an shelf-life τ , such that,
for any symmetric graph G of degree D ≥ 3, the symmetric equilibrium is not stable.
Proof. The proof follows the outline of the Proof of Theorem 2 in [Bramoulle´ and Kranton
2006]. It has two steps. The first step is a simple observation: If ~y < ~y′, then φ ◦ φ(~y) <
φ ◦ φ(~y′). This follows because the response function φ(y) is a decreasing function of y.
The second step is to show that under some small perturbation ~ > 0, we have φ◦φ(~y+
~) > ~y+~ (here the vector inequality ~x > 0 corresponds to coordinate wise inequality xi >
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0 ∀i). In other words, with any small change from the equilibrium, the best response moves
further away (strictly) from the equilibrium. This shows that the equilibrium is not stable in
the sense of [Bramoulle´ and Kranton 2006; Bramoulle´ et al. 2014]. For simplicity’s sake,
we consider only a quadratic cost function.
Let y˜ be the symmetric equilibrium in the symmetric graph of degree D. Then, y˜i =
y˜,∀i. Note that y˜ = φ(y˜) because it is an equilibrium. Here, we perturb all the responses
by some  > 0
φ(~y + ~) = φ(~y) +∇φ · ~
φi(~y + ~) = φi(~y) +D
∂φi
∂yj
 for some j ∈ N(i)
since ∂φi
∂yj
= 0 if j /∈ N(i) and equal otherwise. Similarly,






 any j ∈ N(i)
To show that the symmetric equilibrium is not stable, we need
yi +D
2
( −W (τ 2e−τ y˜)
1 +W (τ 2e−τ y˜)
)2
 > yi + 
W (τ 2e−τ y˜) >
1
D − 1
In other words, we want τ 2e−τ y˜ > 1
D−1e
1
D−1 . Substituting for y˜ (lemma 2) and simplifying,
we get that the symmetric Nash equilibrium is not stable when
2 ln τ − 1
(D + 1)
W (τ 2(D + 1)) > − ln (D − 1) + 1
D − 1 .
Setting τ to be a constant (e.g., τ = 10), one only needs to verify that the following
holds: W (D + 1) < (D + 1)(ln (D − 1) + 2 ln τ)− D+1
D−1 , which is true for D > 3.
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3.3 Conclusion
Knowledge sharing has been greatly facilitated by social network services. Increasingly, it
affects businesses, political debates and public services. Yet, after years of measurements,
the structure of online diffusion remains complex and was shown to vary across media and
topics. Our results identify, how the shelf life of information affects its diffusion. This
leads to various types of specialization that can all be described in the unifying theory of
public good.
While we empirically observe a remarkable match to the theoretical predictions on a
qualitative level, we would like to point out that the current model of public good we in-
troduce is highly idealized, especially as it assumes homogeneous cost of information ac-
quisition. Proving that specialization occurs even in such symmetric cases is, in a sense, a
worst-case result. In reality, several other factors contribute to users exerting higher effort
in information acquisition including enjoyment [Feick and Price 1987], which typically
varies across users depending on topics. However, our results generalize to heterogeneous
perishable public goods to predict, for instance, that a single equilibrium exists whenever
shelf life is sufficiently small. The qualitative effect of shelf life should also remain since
our empirical observations prove it, even in a large number of very different mass media
sources. We do, however, observe some amount of variance within this trend and ac-
counting for other previously identified factors to predict span of content diffusion more
accurately seems a promising direction.
Limitations & Applications Our model considers the case of user decisions based on
one feature of content (the shelf life) but there are other that they might deem relevant
(e.g., topic, length of article, source) resulting in heterogeneous utility functions. This
would result in more complex equilibria but the broad public goods results of more con-
nected network structures resulting in better distribution of effort should still apply (assum-
ing that these utility functions are convex).
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In our public goods modeling, as with any other economics model, we assume rational
behavior. An interesting setting to study would be to understand when a fraction of the
agents are potentially irrational. In this case, we would conjecture that the overall equilibria
results would depend on how the irrational agents are connected to the rest of the graph.
For instance, if they essentially form a clique, then their behavior would not impact the
majority of the users.
Another unpredictable player in social networks is bots that behave in seemingly irra-
tional ways. In this case we could potentially model them as either having a different utility
function or as exhibiting irrationality.
From the perspective of a network designer or social media platform, our results in-
dicate potential avenues to encourage more participation from its users via the network
structure. Public goods results indicate that certain types of networks are better suited for
increased user engagement. Facebook, for instance, could give suggestions of people to
follow based on this principle, potentially resulting in better connected and less partisan
networks.
In most online networks, the networks themselves are not static but rather grow and
change over time. In the next chapter, we study how this evolving structure affects infor-
mation production and user choice.
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Chapter 4
Biases in Network Evolution
From the previous chapter, we know that the existence of specialization is dependent on the
structure of the graph – graphs which are more hierarchical tend to also have more special-
ized equilibria. In this chapter, we focus on understanding the dynamics of specialization
in an evolving graph with network interactions. We use our model to extend the idea of
‘wisdom of the crowd.’
One of their most dramatic consequences of the scale of information sharing on social
media is the deluge of information we consult before any of our life’s decisions: Word
of mouth, electronically delivered, affect where we apply for jobs, who we support for
political office, and our most mundane choices over a dinner plan or our next online pur-
chase. Behind each choice lies a belief in the wisdom of the crowd observed in numer-
ous instances: from Galton’s original experiment on bull weight-judging [Galton 1907],
to recent online applications like collaborative encyclopedia [Kittur et al. 2007], question
answering [Wang et al. 2013] or prediction games [Goldstein, McAfee, and Suri 2014].
Formally, the wisdom of the crowd is said to emerge when an expanding social network
connects each of us to an increasing number of contacts - or equivalently to a growing
collection of information - and it enables everyone to come to an estimation that has quasi
perfect precision.
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In this chapter, we analyze for the first time how the structure of a social network affects
the benefit of information sharing between users who are parsimonious in the information
they share. Our goal is to understand the following question: “Which types of network’s
growth and evolution guarantees everyone to eventually benefit from information sharing?”
We now present the following contributions:
• We introduce a simple model where each participant of a social network attempts to
estimate a value with best possible accuracy, using her own effort as well as sharing
information with her contacts.
• In order to study the effect of topologies on the above general case, we simulate
how nodes’ estimation accuracy vary in our model when contact lists follow some
real word evolution. Our empirical results highlight the complex interaction of in-
formation sharing: First, when the network expands and hence more information get
shared, we find that a majority of nodes suffer on the short term, seeing diminished
accuracy and more individual effort. Second, nodes tend to compensate their losses
and they benefit from network expansion overall, but this typically require network
to double or quadruple in size before a majority benefit. Thirdly, as expected, the
benefits from information sharing at anytime are very uneven. Even when the net-
work size is multiplied by 100, only a small minority see substantial gain. Those
are invariably nodes who appeared earlier and are more connected, new arrivals and
other nodes with smaller degrees benefit much less. (Section 4.2).
• Our theoretical analysis further demonstrates the connection between large unbal-
anced hierarchies and the failure of information sharing to benefit everyone. We
prove that a large class of social networks exhibit an even more advantageous result:
A stronger version of the above vision which we call the “wisdom of parsimonious
crowds”. However, that result is sensitive to network evolution and fails to emerge in
many models of expanding social networks, including, as we prove, those with large




Let us introduce a simple generic collaborative estimation task. We assume N nodes aim
at assessing the same objective mean value of a variable from a set of samples or evaluation
that each of them possesses. We make the usual assumption that the sample of each partici-
pant is a noisy observation and that samples from different nodes are independent variables;
their common mean is precisely the value that each participant aims at estimating.
Participants typically communicate with each other once their observation is made. We
denote by N(i) the list of i’s contacts, which may represent friends, or alternatively mem-
bers of various clubs and social groups in which information relevant to the estimation are
shared. Information is then shared in a social graph G(N,E) where edges are symmetric,
which follows the social etiquette that during information sharing everyone share their ex-
perience within the relevant group. As in many previous works, we will be interested by
sequence of expanding graphs, which grow to expose each user to an ever growing amount
of information.
Now comes the most specific aspect of this estimation model. Instead of assuming that
each individual receive a sample drawn from a fixed exogenous noise model, we assume
that participants are parsimonious. Motivated by various situations below, we assume that
i can individually produce an estimate with quality λi > 0 for a cost following a non-
decreasing and convex function c(λi). That estimate is then shared with all of i’s contacts
during information sharing. Ultimately, i is able to aggregate all estimates from either
her or someone in her contact list N(i) to obtain a more accurate estimation, with overall
quality ζi ≥ λi. To model her incentive towards more accurate estimation, we assume that
i pays afterwards a non-increasing estimation cost G(ζi).
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Motivating scenarios
Beyond the obvious application of individuals wishing to evaluate the quality of a product
through word of mouth, the aggregation of noisy estimates across individuals have multiple
applications including content moderation [Ghosh, Kale, and McAfee 2011] and person-
alization [Taka´cs et al. 2009; Isaacman et al. 2011]. For all those applications, improved
accuracy ultimately enhances a user’s experience, creating a natural incentive for partici-
pants to input accurate information. But we assume that alone is typically not sufficient
to guarantee a minimum quality for every λi. The model of parsimonious agents we in-
troduced draws inspiration from crowd-sourcing models [Ghosh and McAfee 2012; Ghosh
and McAfee 2011] applying to a new social information sharing setting.
Why would one consider estimation with parsimonious users that may provide very
low quality λi? First, the estimation we aim to study may genuinely be difficult and require
significant effort. Second, it could be that this estimation is only one task among many
to be done in a small amount of time. Participants may then answer very fast or very
inaccurately and yet try to make informed estimates overall. Finally, it may not be that
the individual task of estimating is costly per se, but that disclosing this exact value causes
privacy concerns, as modeled in a growing body of research [Ioannidis and Loiseau 2013;
Chessa, Grossklags, and Loiseau 2015; Ramachandran and Chaintreau 2015a]. In this
situation, a participating individual may decide to provide a lower quality λi than the one
it possesses, with the the hope that it does not affect the overall estimate too much while
retaining privacy.
A special case of interest
We will assume without loss of generality that the quality λi of the estimate provided by i is
defined as the inverse of that estimate’s variance σi. If we further assume that the estimate
is Gaussian for every node, this implies that combining two estimates of quality λ1 and λ2,
is equivalent to obtaining a single estimate with quality λ1 +λ2. It follows that in the above
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model we have.




obtained by combining all estimates that node i have produced or seen. All qualitative
results of our model hold however functions c and G defined above are chosen, but for
tractability it helps to consider a specific case. Without loss of generality we can assume
that the estimation error is the variance of the estimate (hence that G(ζi) = 1ζi ). The
choice of the function c is more arbitrary, so to span a large class of convex function,
we will assume that c(λi) = C
2
α+1
λα+1i where α > 1 and C ∈ R. Other choices where
G, c are convex and twice differentiable would make the analysis more complex but not
significantly different.
4.1.2 Best Response and Goal
Each agent seeks to minimize her overall cost: Ji(λi, ζi) = c(λi) +G(ζi).




Ji(λ) s.t. λi ≥ 0
. Hence c′(λi) = −G′(ζi); Since both are convex functions, it is easy to see that the second
derivative is positive and this is hence, a minimum point.
Lemma 14. In the estimation problem, the best response of an agent i, to its neighbors’






Proof. For an agent, i, her best response is given as the solution of c′(λi) = −G′(ζi).














4.1.3 What is Wise Crowd?
We say in this model that a crowd is wise if as the network grows all individuals eventually
have arbitrarily precise estimate (i.e., ζi → ∞). A crowd is private/parsimonious if all
individuals eventually reveal information about their value with arbitrarily small precision
(i.e., λi → 0), or equivalently exerts a vanishing effort. A crowd is privately-wise (or par-
simoniously wise) if all individuals are both wise and private (or parsimonious). Ideally as
there are more users in the system, the increased access to information compensates for the
decreased amount of individual sharing. We would like to understand the conditions under
which a sequence of increasing graphs implies that all individuals are wise and private. In
the rest of this chapter, we will refer to that results as the wisdom of the private crowds.
Theoretical Examples
In the case of a complete graph, previous work has shown that the crowd is always privately-
wise [Chessa, Grossklags, and Loiseau 2015]. On the other hand, a trivial, degenerate case
when wisdom of the private crowds fail is when the degree of some nodes in the graph is
bounded. Another trivial case is that of a d-regular graph.






α+2 . Moreover, if the d is increasing in the size of the graph, wisdom of
the private crowd always exists.
Proof. Let λi = λ∗,∀i ∈ N .
C2 · ζ2i λαi = C2 · ((d+ 1)λ∗)2λ∗α = 1
C2 · (d+ 1)2λ∗α+2 = 1 =⇒ λ∗ = ( 1
C · (d+ 1)
) 2α+2
We see that if d is an increasing function of the size of the graph, λ∗ → 0.
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However, this property does not always generalize to more complex graphs. Indeed,
we show that for a bipartite graph with cubic cost, the crowd usually fails to work together
and in fact, small deviations from symmetry lead to suboptimal outcomes (Section 4.3).
4.2 Evolving Social Graphs
4.2.1 Data
In order to study how individuals’ sharing efforts progress with the growth of the social
graph, we used a dataset which included information about the evolution of the graph. We
used a previously collected dataset based on users who post nytimes.com articles to
twitter.com ([May et al. 2014]). This dataset also includes users and relationships
up to 2 degrees away from the original posters. The final dataset had 346k users and 13
million edges connecting them. We allowed the graph to grow by adding new nodes based
on the following orderings: (1) by creation time of the node on twitter, (2) by activity of the
node posting a nytimes.com article (Note that not all the nodes in the graph were actively
posting so the latter graph is smaller than the first.), and (3) in random order.
Wisdom of the Private Crowd in an Evolving Real World Graph Our primary ques-
tion is whether the crowds become more efficient with increasing graph size. In order to
test this, we evolved the graph from the NYTIMES dataset by starting with an initial graph
of 1.25% of the original size and then adding nodes in the three orderings described, grow-
ing it by 25% in each step. At each stage, the nodes played the ’game’ based on our privacy
model, and we computed the Nash Equilibrium using an iterative algorithm that updates
the best response until convergence [Ramachandran and Chaintreau 2015a]. The point of
convergence (when it converges) is the Nash equilibrium. In the cases that we examined,
the best responses converged to an equilibrium within 20 steps (though our algorithm does
not guarantee convergence).
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Figure 4.1: Heatmap of distribution of λi
for increasing large fractions of the graph.
Figure 4.2: Fractional change in ζi from
one stage to the next. We see that with
larger graphs, there are, in fact, an increas-
ing fraction of nodes who lose.
We see that with more nodes in the network, there are more and more nodes putting in
less effort (λi), i.e., they are taking advantage of their crowd (Figure 4.1). However, this
isn’t the case for everyone and there are some nodes whose effort doesn’t decrease. This is
evident from the bimodal-like distribution of the λi values with one peak at a high λi value
and the other at an increasing low value. This same pattern is observed when examining the
total information that a node sees (ζi). Thus, in a network more complex than a complete
or a d-regular graph, the wisdom of the private crowd property does not trivially exist.
We identify those nodes which are ’winners’, ’losers’ and ’constant’ based on their
difference in effort from the graph in one stage to the next. We would expect that with
more nodes in the network, they leverage each others’ efforts and gain more information
while not having to put in as much effort. We plot, at each stage, the fraction of nodes that
gain, lose or stay the same (Figure 4.2). Surprisingly, we see that this is not the case and,
in fact, there are more losers with larger graphs.
One way to better understand the degree of loss compared to the gains is to consider
a measure of inequality among all the nodes. The Gini index, a measure of statistical
dispersion, is one such measure. The index is based on the Lorenz curve which plots
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Figure 4.3: Gini index measured of the distributions of λi and ζi. The Gini index is a
measure of inequality – lower values indicate less inequality.
the percentage of the effort (or total observed precision) made by the bottom x% of the
population. The Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area between the line of equality and the
Lorenz curve and the total area under the line of inequality. It is typically used as a measure
of income inequality. A Gini index of 0 indicates perfect equality. We plot the Gini index
for the distribution of λi’s and ζi’s for each graph size (Figure 4.3). Here, we can clearly see
that with increasing graph size, the inequality increases (whether considering inequality of
λ or ζ).
Who are the Winners and Losers? While we can clearly see that the degree of inequal-
ity increases with larger graph size, it’s less clear which nodes are the ones who gain or
lose. To better understand this, we split nodes by their relative twitter age, i.e., the number
of stages for which they are present in the network. We plot the relative change in the total
effort that a node sees (ζi) by this relative age, focusing on the final stage of growth from
87% of the network to the whole network (Figure 4.4). We observe that for, other than the
very new nodes, a roughly similar proportion of the nodes lose (depicted in red) from the
penultimate stage to the last one. However, we also note that fraction of nodes that gain




























Figure 4.4: Fractional change in ζi from the penultimate stage to the last stage, split by the
relative twitter age on the x-axis.
when the network grows. We observe that while there are more nodes which are worse off,
the majority of those are newer nodes to the network. Nodes that have been in the network
from the earlier stages have a better chance of eventually gaining, sometimes even by a
large magnitude.
On short time scales, the majority of nodes lose. However, when we look at longer
time spans, we find that nodes tend to compensate for their losses and overall benefit from
the larger networks. Figure 4.5 shows the change in a node’s total precision (ζi) from each
stage to the final graph. Essentially, we ask the question, how much does a node gain/lose
in the end stage compared to the current one? We again see that a node’s age in the network
affects whether they gain or lose. Note that while the last few stages seem like a small part
of the evolution, they actually represent the growth from 75k nodes to 340k nodes. The
young nodes which lose as a result represent a significant fraction of the network.
We see that larger gains only come after significant expansion in the network – the
network has to double or more in size before it affects most nodes. In fact, we see that it
is only after the network grows to more than 15% of its its total size that we see significant
gains. The small minority who have made substantial gains are not only older but they are
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Figure 4.5: Fractional change from current stage to the final network.
also better connected. In figure 4.6 we see that the nodes that gain are increasingly better
connected in larger networks and can, thus, take advantage of that.
The structure of the network itself is a key factor in deciding who are the winners and
losers. We develop a null hypothesis model where the graph grows randomly, rather than
by the nodes’ creation time. We compare this null hypothesis with a graph evolving by
when a node joins the network (Figure 4.2) and when it becomes active in the network
(Figure 4.7). In both the null model and the evolution by activity, the characteristics of
the winners and losers are less skewed and age gives less of an advantage. The natural
evolution clearly results in some hierarchy that results in the observed imbalance of effort.
In the next section, we examine the consequences of such a hierarchy by considering some
simple models.
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Figure 4.6: Difference in degree distributions for winners vs losers. The classification of
winner vs loser is computed from the current stage to the final stage.
4.3 Network Structure and Inequality
In Chapter 3, we saw that the spectral features of the graph, specifically the minimum
eigenvalue, had an impact on the outcome of the equilibrium. Certain graphs were more
susceptible to specialized and unequal outcomes. In this section, we examine how the size
of the graph (and thus structural features) of the graph affects the individual users and
whether they gain or lose overall by being part of a bigger or more connected graph.
4.3.1 Network Normality
Lemma 16. In the estimation problem with a general convex and increasing privacy cost,





≥ 2 · (−µmin − 1).
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Figure 4.7: Fractional change from current stage till the final stage for the graph evolving
by activity (right) and randomly (left).




[Bramoulle´ et al. 2014] .






























≥ 2 · (−µmin − 1)
Lemma 17. In the estimation problem with polynomial privacy cost, the network normality
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≥ 2 · (−µmin − 1)
λi ≤
( α




In networked public goods, the bipartite graph proves to be especially interesting. As
we will see in §4.3.3, graphs with less negative minimum eigenvalues (µmin) values tend




Theorem 18. Let G(L,R,E) be a regular bipartite graph with |L| = m, |R| = n, with
left-degree γn and right-degree γm. Let ρ(n) = m
n
denote the imbalance. When α = 2
(cubic privacy cost), the following holds:
• If limn→∞ ρ(n) = 1, then wisdom of the private crowds exists, i.e., ∀i ∈ L ∪R,
limn→∞ λi = 0 and limn→∞ ζi = ∞. Further, if limn→∞ (m− n)γ > 0, nodes in L
and R accumulate information at increasing, but different rates.
• If limn→∞ ρ(n) = ρ 6= 1, wisdom of the private crowds does not exist.









· β2 · γ2mn−1






For large γ(m− n), limn→∞ β ≈ 1γ(m−n) .
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And, ζ2m ≈ β2
1
C









∴ The crowd is not fully wise. The nodes in M are not wise while the nodes in N are wise.
Case 2 (Balanced Partitions): limn→∞ φ(n) = 1 This case is further divided based on
how γ(m− n) grows. Let the degree of each node be d.
Case 2.1: limn→∞ γ(m− n) = 0
limn→∞ β = 1. ∴ λm = λn. λm or n = 1√
C(d+1)
and limd→∞ λm or n = 0. Thus, the
crowd is always wise.
Case 2.2: limn→∞ γ(m− n) = Θ(1)






For larger degrees, limd→∞ λm = 0 and limd→∞ λn = 0. The crowd is ’wise’ but at
different rates (within a constant factor).
Case 2.3: limn→∞ γ(m− n) =∞
100
Figure 4.8: Privacy choices ((left) λi and (right) ζi) in Nash equilibrium for a bipartite
graph with differential rates of growth in each partition (C = 0.1). The higher degree





· (γ2n2φ(n)− 1)(φ(n)− 1) (from case 1)
≈ 1
C


















The crowd is wise but not equally so; nodes in N becomes wiser faster than nodes in
M .
We see that, in a bipartite graph, even a small deviation from symmetric partitions
results in the better connected partition increasingly benefiting as the cost of the other
partition. To see some examples for how this dynamic plays out, we numerically compute
the Nash equilibrium for increasing sizes of bipartite graphs (Figure 4.8). One partition
grows linearly, the other logarithmically. The higher degree nodes quickly become wise
while the lower degree ones do not improve substantially with size. Thus, we see that
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Figure 4.9: Graphical depiction of
regular arbitrary clustered graph
along with relevant parameters.
wisdom of the private crowd only exists for the nodes that grow much faster.
4.3.3 Clustered Graph
Building on our previous case of the bipartite graph, we consider a model where the two
partitions are connected i.e., a clustered graph. Specifically, we consider the case of a
regular arbitrary graph with two clusters (Figure 4.9).
Definition: Consider a family of graphs Gn1,n2,δ1,δ2,γ with 2 clusters, P1 and P2. Let
|P1| = n1 and |P2| = n2. ∀i ∈ P1, the node i is connected to δ1n1 nodes in P1 and γn2
nodes in P2. The nodes in P2 are similarly connected to δ2n2 nodes in P2 and γn1 nodes in
P1. For convenience in notation, let n1 = n. Let φ(n) = n2n1 be the size imbalance between
the two clusters.
Best response: All the nodes within the same cluster have the same λ since they have
the same degree (and extended neighborhood). As in the case of the bipartite graph, we
express ζ1, ζ2 in terms of λ1, λ2 and simplify.
















We find that β can be further simplified based on the relationships of δ1, δ2, γ and φ. We
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define two characteristics of the graph based on whether the clusters are internally tightly
connected (homophily) or are more connected with each other (heterophily).
Definition: A graph G ∈ Gn1,n2,δ1,δ2,γ is heterophilic when 4δ1δ2φγ2(φ−1)2 → 0 and ho-
mophilic when 4δ1δ2φ
γ2(φ−1)2 →∞.
Lemma 20. When a graph G ∈ Gn1,n2,δ1,δ2,γ is heterophilic, β ≈ (1+δ2n2)γ(n2−n1) . When a graph












4(1 + δ1n1)(1 + δ2n2)
γ2(n2 − n1)2 )




· 4(1 + δ1n1)(1 + δ2n2)











4(1 + δ1n1)(1 + δ2n2)
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(1 + δ1n1)(1 + δ2n2)




Theorem 21. Let G ∈ Gn1,n2,δ1,δ2,γ be a heterophilic graph. When α = 2 (cubic privacy
cost), the following holds:
• If φ = limn→∞ φ(n) > 1 and δ2 = 0, wisdom of the private crowds does not exist.
• If φ = limn→∞ φ(n) > 1 and limn→∞ δ2n =∞, wisdom of the private crowds exists
but nodes in P1 and P2 accumulate information at different rates.
1We use the notation f(n) ≈ g(n) to denote f(n) = g(n)± o(g(n))
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• If limn→∞ φ(n) = 1 and limn→∞ (φ(n)− 1)n = ∞, wisdom of the private crowds
exists.
• If limn→∞ φ(n) = 1 and limn→∞ (φ(n)− 1)n = 0, wisdom of the private crowds
does not exists.
Proof. Case 1 (Clusters are imbalanced): φ(n1) = φ > 1
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Thus, the crowd is partially wise and the partition which is not internally connected doesn’t
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The crowd is wise but unfair with one partition gaining more information than the other.
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∞, if limn→∞ (φ(n)− 1)n =∞
0, if limn→∞ (φ(n)− 1)n = 0
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In the (above) heterophilic case, the internal connections of a cluster can compensate
for the external connections (or lack of) but only if the cluster is sufficiently connected. The
wisdom of the private crowd property only holds in those cases where there is sufficient
compensation.
Theorem 22. Let G ∈ Gn1,n2,δ1,δ2,γ be a homophilic graph. When α = 2, wisdom of the
crowd always exists.
Proof. We consider different cases based on φ.



























Similarly, limn→∞ ζ22 =∞.









, for large n. Since β is a constant, ζ1 and ζ2 are within a constant
fraction. Thus both clusters are wise, though depending on the values of δ1 and δ2, one will
consistently be better off than the other.












− (1 + δ2φn)












− (1 + δ2φn)
→∞ (as in imbalanced case)
The homophilic more closely resembles a complete graph (or rather multiple complete
graphs) and, like the complete graph, always has a wise and private crowd. When we
consider the transition from the extreme hierarchy of the bipartite graph to the less extreme
clustered graph, we see that even a small amount of connectedness within a cluster can be
enough to allow all nodes to be wise. In the next section, we examine a condition based
on spectral properties of the graph that are sufficient for any graph to have a wise, private
crowd.
4.3.4 A General Condition for Wisdom of the Private Crowd
Many graphs, however, do not fall into the extreme conditions seen in the bipartite graph.
Consider a series of graphs of increasing size: since the Nash equilibrium dynamics do
not depend on the way the graph was built but, rather, the overall structure, we can inde-
pendently consider each graph in the series without involving the intermediate stages. As
graphs get larger, the amount of information that is available increases. A wise crowd is
one that takes advantage of this, i.e., even when the amount of individual effort decreases,
the amount of information received by individuals increases. A sufficient condition wis-
dom of the private crowds is for the graph to be network normal, a condition that states
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that when privacy costs are sufficiently low compared to estimation costs, a unique Nash
equilibrium exists [Allouch 2013; Allouch 2015; Bramoulle´ and Kranton 2006; Bramoulle´
et al. 2014].
When considering the best response of a node in the context of network normality, we
find that the amount of work that any node does is bounded and is inversely proportional
to the minimum eigenvalue, µmin. For many graph families, |µmin| increases with the size
of the graph (e.g., µmin = −n2 for a complete bipartite graph of n nodes). Thus we see that
the condition of network normality is sufficient for the crowd to be privately wise.
Theorem 23. For a series of graphsG1, G2, .., Gt, .., whereG1 ⊂ G2 ⊂ G3.., if the graphs
are network normal, |µmin| is an increasing function of |Gt| and lim|Gt|→∞ |µmin| = ∞,
the crowd is privately wise.




< 0 [Allouch 2013; Allouch 2015; Bramoulle´
















> 2 · (−µmin − 1)
λi <
( α
2C · (−µmin − 1)
) 1
(1+α2 )





(1+α2 ) . If µmin increases with the
size of the graph and lim|Gt|→∞ |µmin| = ∞ (which is true for many classes of graph),
then ∀i, λi → 0 (and thus, ζi → ∞). Thus, when a graph is network normal, there is also
wisdom of the private crowd.
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4.4 Conclusion
Social networks and social media enabled information sharing at unprecedented scale. We
expanded on the notion of wisdom of the crowd to also encompass some cost associated
with gathering or sharing information. We introduced a network game between nodes,
allowing them to trade-off the cost of sharing information with the reward of better infor-
mation. We studied the evolution of the equilibria in the growth of a graph derived from
Twitter and showed that while many nodes are better off as the graph grows, a signifi-
cant fraction is worse off. We showed that this results from the hierarchical evolution of
the graph. Using some simple hierarchical models, we showed a connection between the
imbalance in the graph and the failure to achieve ideal information sharing. Further, we
showed a general result, based on spectral features of the graph, which gives a sufficient
condition for the wisdom of the private crowd property to be attained.
109
Conclusion
In this thesis, we aimed to better understand information exchange in online social net-
works. In these studies, we primarily focused on two major questions: (1) To what extent
can we exploit the relationships between different type of data to infer properties of diffu-
sion and (2) How is the structure of a network related to the diffusion of information? To
answer these questions, we relied on several analysis techniques including cross-domain
inference techniques, predictive modeling and game theory.
In these studies, we found that one needs surprisingly little information in order to learn
features of the data. The key to being able to do so is in combining different types of in-
formation that reveal different facets of the data. We use this cross-domain techniques in
several settings. The first setting is one in which we identify even passive individuals online
by integrating private browsing behavior with the network information and the correspond-
ing visible online actions. The second is one in which we use early sharing information,
combined with network based features, to predict performance of posts. With these crucial
pieces of information, we developed a two stage prediction model to accurately estimate
the popularity of a link.
We also saw how network structure and relationships is a key piece of information
across many contexts. While many researchers have previously used these features, we
have shown new techniques and mechanisms through which we can exploit this informa-
tion. It proves useful in identifying users through their uniqueness in their graph position
and friends. It also provides extra knowledge when predicting diffusion by accounting for
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the effect of different types of individuals.
Further, we saw how network structure provides crucial knowledge in modeling user
behavior. We showed how public good models can be used to model content curation and
information flow on social networks. We also prove that the network structure has strong
effects on the resultant equilibria. We showed that the observed specialization arises from
the relationship of spectral features of the network and the lifetime of the content.
4.4.1 Open Questions
Our results lead to many interesting open questions across different aspects of information
diffusion in a network. From an inference perspective, it is interesting to understand the
limits of prediction and inference in a network (both of user data and of network-related
data). For instance, we showed that an hour of data was adequate to predict popularity –
is a minute then enough? ten minutes? Can this limit be broken by integrating additional
pieces of data (from say, additional networks)? When predicting user identity, can we use
similar techniques to identify other properties of the user? We relied on some degree of
uniqueness (k-anonymity) of users. Even if users are not uniquely identifiable, we could
potentially exploit their degree of anonymity to infer some interests and properties. Further,
are there measures that a user can take to resist such privacy-breaking efforts?
There are also many active research questions in the area of content production. Current
models are limited in the complexity of either the network they study or the user behavior.
One way to model content production mechanisms more realistically is to assume hetero-
geneity in individual utility functions. Moreover, in growing and evolving networks, what
are features of real world networks that result in better and worse outcomes? Are there
features of individuals that make them better suited to effectively learn in different types of
networks? As a network designer, are there more optimal ways to suggest edges to add to
the network?
While some of these questions might be answered through social networks analysis
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techniques, newer techniques from other fields might be useful to answer others.
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